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By 2010, 100 percent of the existing stockpile of 
Hellfire and TOW 2A/2B missiles will reach their design 
shelf life.  The stock of Hellfire missiles available to 
support Army air-to-ground combat will be depleted by 2015.  
Of particular interest to the Aviation community is the 
Comanche first unit equipped (FUE) in 2009, which will be 
significantly impacted by the scarcity and condition of 
this primary weapon.  This research employs the Janus 
Combat Model in a Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) 
approach to an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in an effort 
to find a replacement for these legacy missiles.  Janus 
will be utilized to analyze the military worth of a newly 
proposed missile named the Common Missile (CM) as compared 
to its primary aviation employed alternative, the Hellfire 
Missile (HF).  This analysis utilizes an Army Aviation Deep 
Attack scenario developed within the Janus Combat Model for 
this evaluation.  The objective of this research is to 
investigate which missile is the best operational 
alternative for Army Aviation and to determine to what 
extent it is better.  For this research operational 
effectiveness will be evaluated statistically by analyzing 
the systems’ contributions to platform key measures of 
effectiveness such as lethality, survivability, and 
engagement.  Additionally, an operational analysis is 
performed from the warfighter’s perspective examining 
resource requirements and fundamental tactical employment 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A study was accomplished at the direction of the Chief 
of Staff of the Army (CSA), which culminated with the 
identification of a mission need for a common missile that 
could replace current aging ground and air missiles.  Two 
primary field conditions have driven the need for a new 
missile.  These are an insufficient number of tube 
launched, optically tracked, wire-command link (TOW) guided 
missile weapons and Hellfire missiles in existing stockpiles 
to meet Commander in Chief (CINC) war fighting requirements 
and the overall age of the missile inventory.  The stock of 
TOW missiles available to support ground combat will be 
depleted by the year 2012.  By 2010, 100 percent of the 
existing stockpile of Hellfire and TOW 2A/2B missiles will 
reach their design shelf life.  The stock of Hellfire 
missiles available to support Army air-to-ground combat 
will be depleted by 2015.  Of particular interest to the 
Aviation community is the Comanche first unit equipped 
(FUE) in 2009, which will be significantly impacted by the 
scarcity and condition of this primary weapon.  Moreover, 
ground units will be significantly impacted by the lack of 
an advanced missile system to support the Army’s 
Transformation process and its cornerstone systems such as 
the Interim Armored Vehicle (IAV) and the Future Combat 
System (FCS).  The IAV is scheduled for FUE in 2003, 
followed by FCS Milestone C (MS C) in 2010.  These facts 
are the initial conditions that lay the groundwork for a 
valid and critical need for a common missile system. [Ref. 
3] 
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Another key and driving factor is congressional 
concern directed at the many variants of Anti-Tank Guided 
Missiles (ATGM) being developed or maintained by each of 
the Services.  This concern was recognized by the CSA and 
was an additional factor influencing his decision to pursue 
a top down approach to defining the mission need for a 
common missile system.  The interests of Congress and the 
importance of fully exploring this concept are highlighted 
by these comments: 
The Committee questions the need to procure so 
many tank killing systems in a period in which 
our potential adversaries possess significantly 
smaller tank forces…The Committee believes the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint 
Staff must do a better job in reviewing these 
programs to preserve resources for other 
priorities. (A statement from a hearing with the 
House Armed Services Committee.)[Ref. 3] 
The Committee understands that the Army is 
considering moving toward a “common” chemical 
energy missile in the future and that Modernized 
Hellfire is intended to be the baseline program 
to achieve this worthy goal.  The Army is 
encouraged to provide a “Common Missiles” program 
funding line in the next budget submission.” (A 
statement from the Senate Armed Services 
Committee regarding CM.) [Ref. 3] 
A final statement by the House Authorization Committee 
ties the legislative branch’s position together on CM: 
The conferees fully support the Army’s goal to 
reduce the different types of anti-tank missile 
systems in its future tactical inventory…  
Furthermore, the conferees expect the Army to 
begin funding this effort in the fiscal year 2002 
budget submission.  [Ref. 3] 
  2
A critical program objective is to develop the CM to 
support multiple ground and air platforms. [Ref. 4] This 
includes being backward compatible with existing Hellfire 
and TOW platforms.  CM has been identified as the 
Comanche’s principal missile and is critical to the program 
due to its need to reduce weight on the aircraft, while 
improving lethality and range.  The program is also working 
to be available to support the initial deployment of the 
FCS.  The program’s objectives in the logistics area center 
on reduced deployment burden by creating a missile that 
supports the force in total.  This effort is also focused 
on reducing Total Ownership Cost (TOC) through the 
reduction of unit level maintenance required and by 
modularizing the components, which will be common to all 
Services utilizing the CM as their primary ATGM.  This fact 
points the program in a joint direction, which also 
includes key allied nations such as Great Britain.  
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The program office was established in October 2001 and 
is fully staffed as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D 
project.  The program has been horizontally integrated with 
the existing Hellfire program, which allows the CM office 
to benefit from funding lines established for the Hellfire.  
[Ref. 5]  Furthermore, the program is leveraging Science 
and Technology (S&T) investment of over $120 million 
dollars in 2002, which will further mature enabling 
technologies for the missile. [Ref. 3]  This investment 
will provide a higher Technological Readiness Level (TRL) 
for key system subcomponents and allow for a quicker 
integration of the system to meet an accelerated MS B 
decision timeline.  The program strategy is being developed 
and is intending to pursue an evolutionary capabilities 
approach.  The approach is a three block incremental plan, 
which includes the following [Ref. 4]: 
Block I – Initial Core Capabilities, which are defined 
as the following Key Performance Parameters (KPP): Fire-
and-Forget, Man-In-the-Loop, Lethality, System 
Compatibility, and Range. 
Block II – Threshold Requirements not addressed in 
Block I.  Primarily extension to base range. 
Block III – Service Unique Requirements, which is 
primarily Navy centric at this time and will include fixed 
wing platforms employing the missile. 
The current program baseline schedule depicts the 
criticality of this technology being matured and integrated 
by 2003 to meet a First Unit Equipped (FUE) date within the 
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This research will employ the Janus Combat Model in a 
Simulation Based Acquisition (SBA) approach to an Analysis 
of Alternatives (AOA).  Janus will be utilized to analyze 
the military worth of a newly proposed missile named the 
Common Missile (CM) as compared to its primary alternative 
the Hellfire Missile (HF).  The objective of this research 
is to investigate which missile is the best operational 
alternative for Army Aviation.  Additionally, the analysis 
will provide lessons learned concerning the tactical 
employment of the missile and in the use of the combat 
model to support acquisitions.  For this research 
operational effectiveness will be evaluated through 
standard reports produced by Janus and statistically by 
analyzing the systems’ contributions to platform key 
measures of effectiveness such as lethality, survivability, 
and engagement.  This analysis will utilize an Army 
Aviation Deep Attack scenario developed within the Janus 
Combat Model.  This research is a parallel effort not 
formally tied to the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) managed 
CM AOA. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Using the Janus Combat Model, which missile is the 
best operational alternative for Army Aviation and to what 
extent is it better? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• Utilizing tactics modified to take advantage of 
CM's new technological attributes, which missile 
is more effective and to what extent? 
• What tactical benefits does the CM and attack 
aviation combination bring to the battlefield? 
• How can Janus results be useful and meaningful to 
a Program Manager (PM)? 
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope will include a study of the capabilities of 
both the CM and the HF missile; a study of the capabilities 
and limitations of the Janus Combat Model; research on the 
capabilities of the Longbow Apache Helicopter and tactics 
employed in the Deep Attack.  The preceding research will 
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support the development of a force-on-force scenario within 
Janus, which will facilitate the comparative analysis of 
the two alternative missiles.  This thesis will be limited 
to the application of a single scenario within the Janus 
Combat Model.  It will evaluate only the stated measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) developed specifically for this 
research and will not include ongoing research results 
produced by the CM Project Office.  This thesis will be 
unclassified and therefore limited in scope by the 
availability of non-classified data concerning missile-
engineering specifications. 
D. RESEARCH LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consisted 
of the following steps: 
1. Literature Search 
• Conducted a comprehensive literature search of 
project office documents, and DoD regulations. 
• Conducted a study of the Janus model reference 
manuals, past Janus based research projects, 
articles and other library information resources 
concerning its use. 
• Conducted a study of existing Attack Aviation 
doctrine and potential future doctrine. 
2. Data Collection 
• Collected unclassified CM seeker engineering 
specifications and developed a missile model 
within Janus.   
• Further refined the model under the guidance of a 
PEO-Tactical Missiles operations research 
analyst. 
• Evaluated the draft operational requirements 
document and operational mode summary for the CM 
and developed an aviation centric force-on-force 
scenario within Janus. 
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• Collected Janus post processor reports from 
simulation runs of the test scenario using HF as 
the base case, and CM as the primary alternative 
case both employing the same tactics. 
• Collected data on a third case employing fire-
and-forget tactics designed to leverage this 
technological attribute of the modeled CM. 
3. Method of Analysis 
• Used descriptive statistics to analyze test 
scenario post processor report output for each of 
the three cases. 
• Compared the HF's operational effectiveness as 
determined by the statistical analysis to the 
effectiveness of the CM. 
• Compared the results from fire-and-forget case 
against the results from the base and alternate 
case comparative analysis to determine the 
significance of this capability. 
• Analyzed these results further from the 
warfighter's perspective using engagement area 
calculus and comparing noted pros and cons of 
employing each missile. 
4. Synthesis 
• Interpreted the data in a manner that facilitates 
ease of understanding for the non-operations 
research trained individual.   
• Used the results of the statistical and 
operational comparative analysis to determine 
which missile is the best operational 
alternative. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  Chapter I, 
Introduction, provides a detailed look at the impetus for 
this research, and the methods employed to conduct the 
research.   
Chapter II, Background, is intended to frame the 
research in context and provide insight into key 
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externalities and systems that will influence the study.  
This includes an overview of the Janus Combat Model, which 
was the simulation used to execute this study. It 
furthermore discusses the development process of the 
missile modeled within Janus. 
Chapter III, Scenario Description, provides a 
description of the tactical scenario simulated within the 
study.   
Chapter IV, Data Analysis Methodology, outlines the 
statistical and operational analysis by describing how 
Janus was used to assess the alternatives in a simulated 
operational environment.  It defines the MOEs utilized as 
the key parameters for differentiation of the missiles 
within this analytical study.  It also describes the basic 
operational analysis applied within the study. 
Chapter V, Analysis of Data, analyzes the raw data in 
a spreadsheet format and provides the statistical analysis 
of the MOEs.  This includes a graphic statistical portrayal 
of each missile’s performance as compared to the other by 
MOE.  An operational analysis considers the key operational 
differences between the missiles. 
Chapter VI, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides 
the author’s conclusions regarding the thesis research 
questions.  It also includes answers to the subsidiary 
research questions, which provide insight into employing 
the Janus Combat Model in a SBA approach and suggested 
areas for further research on the topic. 
F. BENEFIT OF THIS STUDY 
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This study will build on the body of knowledge 
necessary for the Army to extrapolate the best alternative 
for the identified mission need, but will not be subjected 
to the validation requirements enforced upon the project 
office.  It will also provide valuable lessons learned 
concerning the application of Janus in support of critical 
acquisition decisions. Furthermore, it will increase the 
author’s awareness of potential applications of Janus and 
provide greater understanding of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the use of models and simulation in 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This study has many different external factors 
affecting it, as well as several systems that are 
integrated to achieve the desired research end state.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, a background of the 
externalities and systems involved is required to 
understand the purpose, methodologies employed and findings 
of this research. 
A. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
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This study parallels the efforts of the Program Office 
and the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to 
determine the best alternative for the identified mission 
need.  Analyzing alternatives is part of the Cost as an 
Independent Variable (CAIV) process. An AoA broadly 
examines multiple aspects of a program’s alternatives with 
a focus on determining the best alternative based on the 
understanding of technical risk, maturity, cost and price.  
The analysis must be designed to aid decision makers in 
judging whether the recommended solutions or replacements 
for an existing system warrant the cost.  In most cases, 
and as applied in this research, the analysis will consider 
and baseline against the system that the acquisition 
program will replace.  The Army or Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD) Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) is 
charged with ensuring the AoA is comprehensive, and 
objective.  PA&E provides this assessment to the component 
head, and the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA).  The 
Program Manager (PM) and MDA will consider the analysis, 
and the assessment provided by PA&E for the Milestone B 
decision for all Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1 and 1A 
programs.  An AoA is intended to be quantitative.  Its 
content and conclusions are meant to induce decision makers 
and others involved in the acquisition to enter into 
discussion concerning the assumptions and outcomes of the 
study.  This dialog is necessary to establish better 
program understanding and to ensure everyone involved with 
the decision-making process plays a role in this critical 
initial decision.  There must be a common thread 
established through the AoA, defined system requirements, 
and test and evaluation measures of effectiveness.  The AoA 
will provide insights into the facts surrounding the 
program and answers to some of the assumptions.  It will 
also direct attention to previously unknown facts or new 
assumptions identified through the study.  In the end, the 
analysis must outline the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the alternatives considered within the 
AoA. [Ref. 1] 
This study is part of an analysis of alternatives to 
support a requirement for a missile replacement for the 
Hellfire and TOW missile, which are currently in the Army 
and Marine Corps inventory.  The Common Missile is the 
proposed replacement and is currently being managed by a 
Program Office within the Program Executive Office (PEO) – 
Tactical Missiles.  The AoA calls for a three-phased 
approach (Figure 2).  This study focuses on the operational 
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Figure 2.   CM AoA by Phase [From Ref. 3]. 
 
This analysis is intended to focus on the CM as a 
potential missile solution for Army Aviation.  It will 
specifically address the operational effectiveness of the 
CM, when employed on the Longbow Apache (AH-64D) attack 
helicopter.  This analysis will employ the author’s 
personal experience as an attack helicopter pilot in a 
qualitative assessment coupled with a quantitative 
assessment of the missile using descriptive statistics. 
B. SIMULATION BASED ACQUISITIONS 
This study is an example of the use of simulations to 
support acquisition processes.  The Department of Defense 
(DoD) has established acquisition directives that focus 
upon the integration of technologies throughout the 
acquisition process to reduce cost, improve system 
performance, and reduce the time to field a system.  These 
directives are being carried out through a set of varied 
modeling and simulation (M&S) tools, which when used 
together for the above listed purposes are termed 
Simulation Based Acquisitions (SBA). [Ref. 6] To implement 
SBA the DoD 5000.2-R further charges the program manager 
with many tasks related to planning for M&S usage.  Key to 
this thesis are the following requirements [Ref. 1]: 
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• PMs shall plan for M&S and make necessary 
investments early in the acquisition life cycle. 
• The PM shall use verified, validated, and 
accredited models and simulations, and ensure 
credible applicability for each proposed use. 
• The PM shall use M&S to assess a system against 
design to threats and analyze to threats in those 
scenarios and areas of the mission space or 
performance envelope where testing cannot be 
performed, is not cost effective, or additional 
data is required.  [Ref. 1: p. 5-5] 
These directives are integral parts to a successful 
program, but all of them require more than business 
knowledge to properly carry out.  Specifically, the 
requirement to "ensure credible applicability for each 
proposed use" suggests that the PM and his staff will place 
due consideration into what a particular simulation or 
model can accurately portray and furthermore that they 
believe the results are actually meaningful to the process. 
In the operational world, being technically and 
tactically proficient is a primary tenet of the profession.  
This tenet can be applied within the acquisition world as 
well, when discussing the technical tools of the trade.  
Obviously some level of technical knowledge must be 
obtained to employ M&S as a program tool, but less evident 
is the tactical nature of this tenet's application.  The 
tactical decisions for the program manager are on the 
business battlefield, which often require important 
decisions to be made based on M&S results.  Understanding 
what is behind the data that supports these decisions, 
coupled with the directives established in regulation is 
part of the impetus behind this study. 
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The Janus Combat Model enjoys wide usage and 
acceptance with the acquisition community, as well as in 
the military operations research community.  Janus is 
currently used by many DoD research agencies and program 
offices and is available for use at many military 
installations worldwide.  The fact that it is widely used 
is not only based on its high level of accessibility, but 
also on its ability to accurately replicate the physics of 
the systems it is intended to model.  These facts make it a 
worthwhile SBA tool to use within this study, which will be 
applicable to planning and development in future programs. 
C. OVERVIEW OF THE JANUS COMBAT MODEL 
Janus version 7.06DC is utilized for this research.  
Janus is an interactive, six-sided, closed, stochastic, 
ground combat simulation featuring high-resolution color 
graphical user interface.  The term “interactive” refers to 
the man-in-the-loop real time interaction between the 
person making the tactical decisions and the simulated 
units and equipment they control.  The system is “six-
sided” because six or less friendly/enemy forces can be 
represented in one combat scenario.  In the case of this 
analysis, only two sides will be represented.  The term 
“closed” describes the nature of information flow between 
the opposing forces.  Neither side has perfect knowledge of 
the activities carried out by the other.  “Stochastic” is 
the manner in which the model functions when analyzing and 
determining, according to the laws of probability, the 
outcomes of aspects of battlefield interaction that cannot 
be predetermined.  “Ground combat” captures the focus of 
Janus, which is on the tactical deployment of ground combat 
systems and how each interacts.  It generates an 
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environment where the impacts of combat support and service 
support systems, selected terrain, weather, battlefield 
obscuration, day and night, and a chemical environment 
directly affect the combatant units within the simulation. 
[Ref. 10] 
Janus also incorporates the third dimension of the 
battlefield in its simulation of warfighting.  Both rotary-
wing and fixed-wing aircraft are represented within the 
database.  Players provide movement direction to the 
helicopters in real time, using either Nap of the Earth 
(NOE) or a high altitude/high airspeed profile.  The 
simulation algorithm for a helicopter then prescribes the 
movement at the stationary Firing Position (FP) or within 
the bounds of an Attack by Fire Position (ABF).  The 
helicopters will pop up from a low hover to a high hover, 
scan the terrain within their Line-of-Sight (LOS) and then 
drop back down to a concealed low hover.  In the concealed 
or masked position the player can analyze the results of 
the scan and determine which targets to engage. This 
maneuver is repeated until they detect and engage a target 
or are ordered to move.  Helicopters within Janus can 
deliver missiles, terminally guided munitions (TGM), 
rockets, and large caliber gunfire, e.g. 30 mm.  
The scenario planner in preparation for the simulation 
establishes weather conditions.  These parameters are based 
on a defined season of the year, visibility, and terrain 
type.  Weather data sets within Janus incorporate wind 
speed and direction, cloud ceiling, relative humidity, 
temperature, inversion factor, sky-to-ground brightness 
ratio, and ambient light level.  These are all of keen 
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concern to this analysis due to the impact of these 
conditions on target acquisition by the firing platform. 
Target acquisition capability within the simulation is 
assessed by two factors.  First, the firing platform must 
have an uninterrupted LOS to the target.  Intervisibility 
with the target is the most critical factor.  Second, the 
firing platform’s sensor, as influenced by the weather, 
battlefield conditions, and range to target, must be such 
that the sensor can still detect the target.  These 
determinations are accomplished through established 
algorithms, which may not be modified by the player or 
analyst.  Third, optical and thermal sensor characteristics 
and performance parameters are critical to the acquisition 
and are of particular interest within this analysis.  The 
firing platform, AH-64D, and the CM have some form of 
sensor, which must be replicated to accurately model the 
missile’s performance.  Janus allows the analyst to define 
the field-of-view size of the sensor, spectral band, and 
mean resolvable temperature and mean resolvable contrast 
(thermal and optical) as a function of cyclical rate.  The 
core Janus data for acquisition sensors was developed and 
provided by the Night Vision and Electronic Sensors 
Directorate (NVESD).  The data were further augmented for 
this analysis with thermal and optical input gained from 
the CM Project Office regarding seeker-engineering 
specifications for the concept CM. [Ref. 17] These 
specifications apply solely to the missile seeker and not 
to the helicopter targeting optics. 
The terrain in Janus is based on digitized terrain 
elevation data developed by the National Imagery and 
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Mapping Agency (NIMA).  Maps of 1:50,000 scale are 
integrated into the terrain database and provide features 
such as contour lines, roads, rivers, and vegetation.  A 
“Polygonal” terrain feature representation is the basis for 
the graphical user interface.  For this analysis a terrain 
file of southern Poland will be utilized.  This file is 
maintained by TRADOC Analysis Center - Monterey (TRAC-MTRY) 
and is also utilized for analysis by TRADOC Analysis Center 
– White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-WSMR).  Furthermore, 
TRAC-Leavenworth (TRAC-FLVN) and the project office have 
used the same terrain to support their AoA. [Ref. 17] 
D. MODEL INPUTS 
This analysis required the input of conceptual 
engineering data provided by the program office into the 
Janus database to develop a working model of the CM.  The 
existing database provided by TRAC-MTRY contains models of 
the AH-64D and assorted threat systems that will also be 
used in this analysis.  The input data setup is the most 
critical and complex aspect of using Janus.  It is further 
complicated because inherent, subtle relationships between 
different types of data may not be intuitively obvious and 
can lead to some inevitable surprises. [Ref. 10: pp. 2-11]  
These include inputs for system performance data such as 
weapons accuracy based on probability of hit, and lethality 
based on probability of kill given a hit.  Operational 
input regarding the system includes specific aspects of the 
firing/engagement cycle such as acquisition time, reload 
time, time between trigger pulls.  The system’s doctrinal 
or envisioned tactical plan dictates other critical 
operational data to input.  These inputs include target 
type rankings for engagement planning or round selection 
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priorities.  The critical model inputs for the systems 
utilized for this study, their weapons, and sensors are 
described in the following sections. 
1. System Model Inputs 
The system is defined for this study within the Janus 
database as the AH64DCM and is based on the existing AH-64D 
model within the Combat Systems Database (CS data).  The 
system section of the database retains the AH64DCM as an 
amalgam of the aircraft, its associated target acquisition 
system and on board weapons.   
The system characteristics section retains the 
AH64DCM’s basic operational data.  This section includes 
the specifications for maximum aircraft speed, maximum 
visibility, and weapon range.  All of the basic aircraft 
parameters were copied from the existing AH-64D model 
within the CS data with the exceptions of maximum 
visibility, which was increased from 9 kilometers to 20 
kilometers.  This unclassified figure represents the 
expected capabilities of future onboard targeting sensors 
and was developed based upon input from modeling personnel 
from the Project Manager’s Office (PMO).  [Ref. 17]  The 
maximum effective weapon range was extended from 8 to 12 
kilometers to represent the unclassified threshold for air-
to-ground attack by the CM.  A basic load of 16 missiles 
was modeled for the AH64DCM, which equals the basic load of 
the HF equipped AH-64D.  
2. Weapons Model Inputs  
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The CM model was based upon a copy of the HF missile 
model already within the CS data.  The HF based data were 
confirmed against the data residing in the project office’s 
database prior to modification.  The aim and reload times, 
rounds per trigger pull, and round velocity were not 
changed in the CM model once copied from the HF model.  The 
weapon model developed from this process was named Common 
Missile Direct Fire or CM DF, as denoted in the database.  
Additional inputs required for the development of the model 
are the round guidance, probability of hit (PH) and 
probability of kill (PK) tables.   
The round guidance establishes the model parameters 
for how the missile is guided to the target.  This includes 
information on the guidance mode utilized by the aircraft 
in tandem with the missile seeker, the capability to fire 
on the move, and the sensor type.  The model guidance was 
changed to reflect the CM fire-and-forget capability.  In 
the base case, HF versus CM, a restricted CM model not 
capable of fire-and-forget was used to evaluate the 
benefits gained by the basic improvements in missile 
technology between the two variants.  In the final case, 
fire-and-forget was applied in an unrestricted guidance 
mode.  This essentially means the aircraft can fire and 
move at will.  Terminal guidance of the missile was not 
required in this mode. 
Probability of hit is defined as the probability of 
hitting a target at a given range with a single trigger 
pull.  Probability of kill is defined as the probability of 
killing a target given a target hit.  Both PH and PK are 
functions of range.  Janus uses a probability function to 
describe the PH and PK for a given weapon as a function of 
range.  Moreover, a random seed was utilized during each 
run of the scenario, which further influenced this 
probability function.  This in turn created independent 
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outcomes from each run.  Unclassified PH and PK information 
for Common Missile was provided by the modeling personnel 
from the PMO. [Ref. 17] 
3. Sensors Model Inputs 
The sensor is defined in Janus for both the firing 
platform and the missile seeker.  Since the HF and CM are 
both fired from the AH-67D, no changes were made to the 
aircraft onboard sensor other then range.  The aircraft 
Forwarding Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensor, its field-of-
view, and spectral band to include supporting mean 
resolvable temperature tables (cycles per milliradian 
versus temperature or contrast) remain the same for both 
cases.   
The concept CM is a tri-mode seeker.  This type of 
seeker cannot be accurately replicated in Janus, but has 
been represented in the sensor section of the database as a 
millimeter wave and infrared capable missile.  The HF is 
modeled as a laser guided missile only.  The Longbow HF 
millimeter wave guided missile is not utilized.  This is 
because the fielding plan calls for the replacement of the 
HF II missile by the CM prior to 2010, which is the 
timeframe, used for this AoA. [Ref. 2] 
E. MODEL OUTPUTS 
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Key to this study is the capability of Janus to 
support battle analysis.  Battle results can be viewed on 
the Janus Analyst Workstation (JAAWS) and the Janus Plan 
View Display (JANPVD).  Both of these options provide the 
capability to replay the battle exactly as it ran during 
the simulation.  For quantitative analysis this graphic 
output is insufficient, but JAAWS and JANPVD also support 
selective retrieval of critical system and force data 
resulting from the simulation.  This data once selected can 
be printed as a detailed battle report, which is usable for 
analysis.   
The development of a scenario within Janus will be 
required to support this analysis.  Scenario development is 
the process of selecting specific systems and weapons, 
terrain, force structures, and battlefield conditions to be 
represented in the scenario.  This requires detailed 
planning down to the tactically correct placement of those 
systems and weapons on the simulated terrain.  It also 
includes the development of command and control overlays 
within the database.  To effectively run a scenario all of 
the above processes must be completed.  The standard 
development sequence of events, which was used for 
developing this study scenario, is outlined in the figure 3 
below. [Ref. 10: pp. 2-14] 
After the scenario has been developed and verified, it 
is ready for execution and analysis.  The completed 
scenario can be maintained, and interacted with on demand.  
The results of each simulation are stored in a sequential 











SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
 
• Use the Terrain Editor (TED) to create or 
modify the terrain file to be used by the 
scenario. 
• Use the Symbol Editor (SYMBOLS) to create or 
modify the two symbol files to be used by 
the scenario. 
• Use the Combat Systems Data Editor (CSDATA) 
to review and/or modify performance 
characteristics of systems to be used in the 
scenario. 
• Use the Scenario Forces Editor (FORCE) to 
create or modify military forces (Force 
File) to be used by the scenario. 
• Use the Command and Control Overlay Editor 
(COED) to perform tactical planning by 
drawing command and control graphics before 
or during scenario execution. 
• Scenario initialization and merging can be 
used to modify existing scenarios or create 
new scenarios. 
• Use the Janus scenario verification programs 
(VFYSCEN and GRAFVFY) to verify the accuracy 
and completeness of the weapons and systems 
data to be used by the scenario. 
• Execute the Janus scenario 
• Analyze/review the results of the scenario 
execution (programs POSTP, and/or JAAWS and 
JANPVD). 
 
Figure 3.   Janus Scenario Development [From Ref. 10]. 
 
F. DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMON MISSILE 
The CM will be an advanced non-kinetic energy missile 
optimized to defeat individual point targets listed in the 
Systems Threat Assessment Report (STAR) at maximum standoff 
range, while minimizing the exposure of the firing platform 
to enemy fire.  The same missile will be employed by both 
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ground and air platforms.  The intended target spectrum 
includes bunkers, transporter-erector launchers (TELs), 
radar sites, tracked armor, command sites, and patrol 
boats. [Ref. 7: p. 3]  The missile will have a multi-mode 
seeker incorporating semi-active laser (SAL), infrared 
(IR), and millimeter wave (MMW) technologies to allow for 
line-of-sight, non-line-of-sight, and beyond line-of-sight 
engagements.  It will incorporate generation IV counter 
active protection system technology, making it effective 
against all current and projected threats through 2015. The 
multi-mode seeker enables all weather employment and 
increases probability of hit in both a man-in-the-loop and 
fire-and-forget modes of operation.  The CM model studied 
will have a maximum range of 12 km and an improved 
lethality over the legacy systems it is intended to 
replace.  Moreover, the missile will utilize a gel-based 
propellant that will reduce launch signature, while still 
increasing the standoff. Due to advances in warheads the CM 
lethality will increase, while the overall weight of the 
missile will decrease.  The missile is to not exceed the 
weight of the current TOW missile, which is 70 pounds. 
[Ref. 8]  
 
 





G. DESCRIPTION OF THE HELLFIRE MISSILE 
The Hellfire (HF) provides heavy anti-armor capability 
for attack helicopters. HF employs a SAL seeker to home in 
on a laser spot that can be projected from ground 
observers, other aircraft, or the launching aircraft 
itself. This enables the system to be employed in a variety 
of modes: autonomous, remote, single shot, rapid, or ripple 
fire.  In an indirect engagement its target designation is 
accomplished by one aircraft, while another servicing 
aircraft provides the remote fire.  The HF missile features 
dual warheads for defeating reactive armor, electro-optical 
countermeasures hardening, semi-active laser seeker, and a 
programmable autopilot for trajectory shaping. The AGM-114K 
missile known as the Hellfire II is the version that will 
be utilized as the baseline for this analysis.  This 
missile has an unclassified maximum effective range of 8 km 
and weighs 100 pounds.  It is capable of operating with 
either pulsed radar frequency or A-Code laser codes for 
those aircraft equipped with dual code capability.  
Hellfire II incorporates many capabilities including the 
ability to overcome laser obscurant/backscatter generated 
by dust, smoke, or weather, which negatively affects most 
laser guided missiles on the battlefield. Other features 
include electro-optical countermeasure hardening, target 
reacquisition capability, an advanced technology warhead 
system capable of defeating reactive armor configurations 
projected into the 21st century, reprogramability to adapt 
to changing threats and mission requirements, and shipboard 




Figure 5.   Hellfire II. 
 
H. DESCRIPTION OF THE LONGBOW APACHE (AH-64D) 
The AH-64D will be the firing platform for this study 
of the CM.  The AH-64D Longbow Apache is a modernized A 
model Apache equipped with a mast mounted fire control 
radar (FCR), a radar frequency interferometer (RFI).  The 
AH-64D has a maximum payload of 16 fire-and-forget radio 
frequency (RF) guided or semi-active laser (SAL) guided 
Hellfire missiles, 1,200 rounds of 30mm High Explosive Dual 
Purpose (HEDP) munitions, and 72 Folding Fin Aerial Rockets 
(FFAR) of various types.  The aircraft has a maximum gross 
weight limitation of 21,000 pounds, and the number of 
available wing hard points is the only restriction to its 
weapons load.  A typical mission load is 16 HF missiles, 
and 600 rounds of 30mm. [Ref. 13]  The aircraft’s maximum 
fuel capacity is 260 gallons of fuel, which gives it an 
average mission duration, at sea level and low ambient 
temperature, of two and one half hours.  It also includes a 
digital communication suite, and automatic target 
classification system.  Dual standard 1553 buses support 
all of these electronics.  [Ref. 22] 
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The FCR can detect, classify, and prioritize up to 128 
targets and define them as tracked, wheeled, air defense, 
unknown, helicopter or fixed wing aircraft.  The RFI is a 
passive electronic support measure system that provides for 
the detection, acquisition, identification, classification, 
location and prioritization of radar emitters.  It is 
designed to detect and acquire threat emitters well beyond 
their lethal range before they can detect the Longbow 
Apache.  The RFI is primarily an offensive system providing 
narrow field-of-view (FOV) target cueing for onboard and 
off board sights/sensors for the accurate and timely 
employment of weapons.  Onboard sights include second 
generation Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) for targeting 
and navigation, low light television, and optical. 
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The combination of the FCR, the RFI, and the advanced 
navigation and avionics suite of the aircraft provide 
increased situational awareness, lethality and 
survivability for the AH-64D.  Dual embedded GPS/Inertial 
Navigation Systems (EGI) permit the Longbow Apache to 
conduct precision maneuver, engagement and attack.  Targets 
acquired by AH-64D sensors with data detailing threat 
classification and location, along with speed and direction 
of movement, can be digitally transmitted to other Longbow 
Apaches as a target handoff or for remote shots.  This data 
may also be passed to the Army Airborne Command and Control 
System (A2C2S), to the Joint Surveillance Target Attack 
Radar System (J-STARS) or to the aviation and ground 
commander’s Tactical Operations Center (TOC) through the 
Common Ground Station (CGS).  From the CGS this data can be 
provided to other elements of the combined arms team 
through the All Source Analysis System (ASAS).  Information 
derived from Apache sensors can fill voids in the relevant 
common picture and expand the battle space when sensor-to-
shooter linkages are met. [Ref. 11: p. 1]  
 
 
Figure 6.   Longbow Apache Helicopter [From Ref. 22]. 
 
In summary, this overview of the many different 
external factors and systems involved with this study lays 
the groundwork for understanding the purpose and findings 
of this research.  The next chapter of the study will 
assimilate these factors and systems into a scenario 
tailored for the required analysis. 
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III. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
To support this analysis an attack helicopter company  
(ATKHC) equipped with the AH-64D represented by eight 
modeled entities is employed in a force-on-force scenario.  
This scenario is based on an ATKHC in a deep attack to 
support a heavy division’s operations.  The same tactical 
scenario is utilized for each case analyzed.  The opposing 
forces (OPFOR) consist of a multiple rocket launcher (MRL) 
battalion supported by a tank company.  The OPFOR also 
includes a platoon of air defense artillery (ADA).  The 
OPFOR is represented by 32-modeled entities. 
The paragraph below doctrinally defines the deep 
attack [Ref. 12: pp. 3-20]: 
Deep operations may be conducted simultaneously 
with close and/or rear operations. Deep 
operations comprise activities directed against 
enemy forces not in contact with friendly ground 
forces. The objective of deep operations is to 
delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces, 
facilities, and high-payoff systems. These 
activities are designed to influence the 
conditions in which current/future close 
operations are occurring or will occur. At the 
tactical level, deep operations shape the 
battlefield to obtain advantages in subsequent 
engagements. Successful deep operations create 
the conditions for future victory. The principal 
targets of deep operations are the freedom of 
action of the opposing commander and the 
coherence and tempo of his operations. 
To support a deep attack the ATKHC moves across the 
Forward Line of Troops (FLOT), which is established along a 
major east-west river, to attack the OPFOR.  This attack 
scenario employs only the ATKHC’s organic weapons against 
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the OPFOR unit, which is established in a stationary firing 
position.  See Figure 7 for the basic ATKHC scheme of 
maneuver.  The remainder of the OPFOR division is not 
represented in the scenario.  After traveling approximately 
135 km at a 100 knot ground speed to the designated Attack 
–by-Fire Positions (ABF) for this attack, the ATKHC has 30 
minutes to engage the target and return to base (RTB) due 
to fuel limitations.  The commander’s intent for this 
attack is to destroy the MRL battalion and its supporting 
elements.  The doctrinal criteria for destruction equates 
to 70 percent (22 vehicles within this scenario) of the 
OPFOR being destroyed. [Ref. 14]  For purposes of this 
analysis the time allotted for each simulated run is 40 
minutes.  Ten minutes of this time is allocated to movement 
from the company release point along attack routes to each 





































FLOT – Forward Line of Troops
SP – Start Point
RP – Release Point
ACP – Air Control Point
PP – Passage Point
ABF – Attack-by-Fire Position





Figure 7.   ATKHC Deep Attack. 
 
A. TERRAIN 
The scenario utilizes a 15-meter resolution terrain 
file of southern Poland.  The CM Program Office selected 
Poland as the terrain for their Janus CM study.  [Ref. 17]  
This terrain file is used within this study to apply a 
similar tactical rigor to this research’s deep attack 
scenario.  This terrain is best defined as rolling terrain, 
heavily forested, with significant restricted terrain due 
to streams and rivers.  The road networks within the 
terrain are primarily dirt/unimproved roads with access to 
paved roads available heading in all cardinal directions.  
The vegetation and rolling hills provide challenging 
terrain to achieve shooter to target intervisibility from 
great distances.   
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B. ATTACK COMPANY STRUCTURE 
The ATKHC of Longbow Apaches consists eight aircraft 
divided into two platoons of four aircraft.  The company 
mix consists of three aircraft equipped with FCR and five 
without the radar.  The ATKHC fights in teams.  In this 
study four teams of two will be employed.  Three teams will 
consist of one FCR aircraft and one without radar.  One 
team will be without radar capability.  ATKHCs often are 
employed independent from the battalion, but would be 
employed with other ATKHC should the commander determine a 
continuous attack is required to ensure that his intent is 
met.  In this case, one company is deemed sufficient to 
destroy the multiple rocket launcher battalion. 
C. ATTACK COMPANY TACTICS 
A deep attack operation has three major phases.  The 
enroute phase, the actions on the objective phase, and 
return to base. [Ref. 14]  Only actions on the objective 
will be simulated for this study.  Enroute operations and 
the return to base, while critical facets of a deep attack, 
do not set the conditions for evaluating the effectiveness 
of the CM.  Actions on the objective include the actual 
attack on the primary target set within the company’s 
preplanned engagement area (EA), and any additional 
movement required to acquire and attack OPFOR to meet the 
commander’s intent of 70 percent of the OPFOR battalion’s 
systems destroyed.  The company will move in teams of two 
and occupy the ABF as a platoon.  The team will be in a 
lead-wingman formation with the FCR equipped AH-64D in the 
lead.  The FCR aircraft will scan the battlefield as the 
team moves into the BP and once established will scan the 
designated EA for targets.  The team will engage any 
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targets encountered during movement to the ABF.  Targets 
acquired by the RFI would be passed digitally via a radar 
frequency handover (RFHO) to the wingman for a team 
solution and attack, but this capability is not replicated 
in Janus.  Immediate threats to the aircraft will be 
attacked autonomously. The figure below depicts the lead-
wingman concept that will be utilized in this scenario. 
[Ref. 13: p. 2] 
 
 
Figure 8.   Lead-Wingman Formation detecting ADA. 
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Once established in the ABF the company will engage 
targets in the EA and subsequent targets of opportunity 
utilizing a company fire distribution plan.  This plan 
assigns scan sectors for engagement for each of the teams 
in the company.  The intent of the fire distribution plan 
is to prevent multiple missiles being fired at the same 
target and, in the end, ensures the efficient destruction 
of the OPFOR unit.  The fire distribution plan is a 
tactical tool and is dynamic.  Due to unforeseen 
circumstances such as a target of opportunity or the OPFOR 
not being positioned within the EA, the commander will 
establish a new fire distribution plan during the attack.  









Figure 9.   Fire Distribution Plan. 
 
D. OPFOR UNIT STRUCTURE 
The MRL battalion is comprised of 18 122-mm, BM-21 
systems.  These rocket artillery systems are truck mounted.  
The battalion is broken down into three firing batteries of 
six BM-21 systems each, a headquarters and control platoon, 
and a service and supply platoon.  For this simulation only 
the firing batteries will be replicated.  Additionally, the 
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MRL battalion is task organized with a tank company to 
increase their survivability, during the offensive.  The 
tank company is comprised of ten T-72 tanks, which are 
broken down into three tank platoons.  Each platoon 
consists of three tanks.  The commander’s tank is the 
remaining tank and is placed to supervise and weight the 
company’s main effort.  The MRL battalion is further 
supported by a platoon of 23-mm Anti-Aircraft (AA) Guns, 
ZSU-23-4.  This platoon consists of two sections of two 
guns, which have been task organized with two of the tank 
platoons. [Ref. 16] 
E. OPFOR EQUIPMENT DESCRIPTIONS 
The OPFOR systems utilized for this analysis were 
taken from the existing Janus Combat Systems Database and 
are the same OPFOR systems utilized by TRAC in their 
analysis efforts regarding the CM.  The BM-21, T-72, and 
ZSU-23-4 are well-proliferated systems, which can be 
expected to be encountered by the CM equipped AH-64D 
throughout the 2010-2015 timeframe. 
The T-72 model is equipped with a 125mm smooth bore 
main gun, which has a maximum effective range of 4,000 
meters.  The main gun is capable of engaging and destroying 
the AH-64D.  It is also armed with a 12.7mm machine gun 
with a max effective range of 1,200 meters.  The model of 
tank utilized for this scenario is also armed with an AT-11 
missile, which is highly effective against helicopters out 
to 5,000 meters.  The tank is equipped with a ballistic 
computer for firing solutions against ground and air 
targets and has thermal imaging capabilities.  See Figure 
10.  [Ref. 23] 
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Figure 10.   T-72 Main Battle Tank. 
 
The 122-mm BM-21 systems are not equipped for self-
defense against an airborne threat.  The firing batteries 
of BM-21s are laid in firing positions oriented towards the 
ATKHC avenue of approach and do not move during this 
scenario.  The batteries are positioned tactically with 
dispersion to act as a passive defense against direct or 
indirect fire attacks.  They rely solely on the firepower 
provided by the task organized armor/air defense platoons 
for protection. See Figure 11.  [Ref. 24] 
 
 
Figure 11.   BM-21 Multiple Rocket Launch System. 
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The modeled ZSU-23-4 is a four-barreled 23-mm anti-
aircraft weapon integrated into a tracked chassis.  The 
system does use radar for range to target, but engages 
using its primary optics only.  The optics are effective 
out to 2,500 meters.  The round utilized by the ZSU-23-4 is 
highly effective against the AH-64D.  The ZSU-23-4 relies 
heavily in this scenario on cover and concealment to ensure 
survivability up to the point of engagement.  See Figure 
12. [Ref. 25] 
 
 
Figure 12.   ZSU-23-4 Air Defense System. 
 
F. OPFOR TACTICS 
The MRL battalion poses a considerable threat to the 
friendly division’s rear and is considered a high payoff 
target (HPT) by the division commander.  This MRL battalion 
is assigned to the self-propelled artillery regiment 
organic to the OPFOR tank division. [Ref. 16: p. 21]  The 
division commander has positioned the rocket artillery to 
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support offensive operations.  The MRL battalion is firing 
under centralized control in support of the division’s main 
attack axis. However, it could also conduct rapid maneuver 
to any axis, as required, to inflict losses on main 
friendly groupings.  
For this simulation the battalion is established in a 
notional assembly area (AA) and have laid its tubes to 
support an upcoming offensive.  The initial scenario 
conditions positions each of the three firing batteries 
within an independent 2 km square area to facilitate 
communications and centralized fire control.  They have 
access to a road network, but will not attempt to 
retrograde from the AA when they come under direct fire.  
The OPFOR will employ its task organized tank/ADA teams as 
an overwatch element, while the MRL battalion is in its 
firing positions.  The overwatch elements are initially 
positioned on high ground within 1 km of the AA.  Their 
systems are oriented on high-speed avenues of approach to 
the AA.  The overwatching tank/ADA teams will engage any 
threat within range of their primary weapon systems.  [Ref. 
15] 
In summary, this chapter provides the conditions under 
which the evaluated systems will operate under and the 
tactics that will be applied by both friendly and OPFOR 
modeled entities.  Understanding the mechanics of the 
scenario is key to interpretation of the forthcoming data 
produced by Janus.  The detail applied to the scenario 
development is a key factor influencing the resultant 
research conclusions.  This chapter shows that detailed 
consideration was given to the development of a scenario, 
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which appropriately supports this study.  In the next 
chapter the manner in which the alternative missiles will 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW 
The ATKHC will execute attacks utilizing the same 
scenario equipped first with the HF, and then with the CM.  
The HF simulation will act as a base case for comparison.  
The ATKHC will employ the missiles in a direct fire mode 
and will utilize the same tactics in both of these cases.  
Twenty-five iterations of each case will be run.  The raw 
data from these runs is presented in Appendix B.  Each run 
will produce an engagement report and coroner’s report for 
further analysis.  A third case will be run, which will 
have the ATKHC employing the CM in a fire-and-forget mode 
designed to identify the significance and operational 
benefits of the CM new technical attributes.  This 
iteration is compared to the first two cases, and will 
provide operational insights into the CM’s future 
employment.  Each iteration will run 40 minutes, which 
represents ten minutes of enroute time from the release 
point (RP) to the ABF and 30 minutes of on station time for 
the ATKHC.  The analysis will examine three primary MOEs 
lethality, survivability, and engagement as a basis of 
comparison between the missile types.  The analysis will 
also consider several additional data requirements, which 
are intended to support and add depth to the evaluation of 
these MOEs.  The analysis of data generated by the 
simulation runs are broken into two parts: a statistical 




B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
The data will be analyzed by utilizing Excel and a 
statistical add-in named “Analyse-it”. [Ref. 26]  The post 
processor reports provide the raw data from each run, which 
will be input into the Excel spreadsheet.  The statistical 
analysis utilizes descriptive statistics to examine the raw 
data.  Mean, standard deviation, and range of the data from 
each run will be examined and compared by Measure of 
Effectiveness (MOE).  This comparison will be graphically 
supported by the use of side-by-side boxplots.   
The boxplot provides a quick impression of the 
distribution of data.  It depicts the median of the data by 
a centered straight line, and the area to either side of 
the median represents the spread of the central 50 percent.  
The area corresponding to 1.5 times the interquartile is 
represented by the dotted line. Values that occur beyond 
1.5 times the interquartile range are shown as outliers by 
a plus symbol.  Values over 3.0 interquartiles away are 
depicted as circles.  The line with a diamond on it 
represents the samples parametric statistics.  The diamond 
shows the mean and the requested confidence interval around 
the mean.  The parametric statistic is a standard output 
from the Anaylse-it software, but will not be used during 
this analysis.  The combination of the descriptive 
statistics comparison of each MOE and the boxplot 
constitutes the statistical analysis.  The additional data 





Figure 13.   Side-by-Side Boxplot Example. 
 
C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
This study will concentrate on three MOEs to detect 
any discernible differences between the two missile types.  
The MOEs are derived from the KPPs, as well as critical 
operational issues for the employment of the CM by attack 
helicopters.  
1. MOE 1 – Lethality 
Lethality is designated a KPP for the CM. [Ref. 7]  
The CM is intended to deliver a greater single shot 
probability of kill (sspk) than the HF missile.  Each 
force-on–force battle simulation will be evaluated by the 
following criterion: 
• The total number of threat systems killed by each 
missile type. 
2. MOE 2 – Survivability 
This MOE is measured by the ability of the AH-64D to 
survive the engagement.  This MOE is also a critical 
operational issue for attack aviation.  Consideration of 
the benefits to survival provided by each missile type will 
be evaluated by the following criterion: 
• The total number of attack helicopters killed by 
threat weapon systems. 
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3. MOE 3 – Engagement 
The ability of the missile and AH-64D combination to 
engage targets will be determined by the ability to hit and 
kill the target at the greatest ranges.  The ability to 
engage encompasses the ability to detect.  The objective is 
to identify the missile, which provides the maximum 
standoff and kill capability.  This parameter will be 
measured by: 
• The average range of a shot, which resulted in an 
OPFOR kill. 
4. Additional Data Requirements 
Additional data requirements that support the 
evaluated MOEs will be included in this study to provide 
additional depth and benefit to the analysis.  Each missile 
will also be further analyzed by examining the following 
criteria: 
• The missile’s kill efficiency will be evaluated 
by examining the threat killed/missiles fired.  
This measure will provide additional insight on 
lethality. 
• The average OPFOR system to aircraft kill range 
will be evaluated.  This measure will provide 
additional insight on the missile’s impact on 
aircraft survivability. 
• The minimum and maximum range, which resulted in 
an OPFOR kill.   
D. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The operational analysis will be largely qualitative 
in nature.  It will be based upon the experience of the 
author as a doctrine developer, attack helicopter pilot, 
instructor, and company commander.  This analysis will 
examine the perceived tactical benefits of the CM as 
compared to the HF missile within the simulated deep attack 
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scenario.  The resulting analysis will identify what the 
AH-64D and CM combination bring to the battlefield from the 
warfighter’s perspective.  Additional analysis will include 
a quantitative examination of each missile type based upon 
Engagement Area Calculus.  Engagement Area Calculus is a 
tool utilized by the tactical planner of attack aviation 
operations to determine how many aircraft and munitions 
will be needed to achieve the commander’s intent.  This 
determination is largely based upon threat force size and 
the kill efficiency of the primary weapon system to be 
employed.  In this scenario, the commander’s intent is to 
destroy the MRL battalion and supporting elements, which 
equates to 70 percent of the OPFOR systems or 22 out of 32 
systems destroyed.  The results of the application of this 
procedure against the CM and HF cases will be compared to 
determine if there is a significant difference in the 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The primary thrust of this research is to determine 
which missile is the best operational alternative for Army 
Aviation and to determine to what extent it is better.  
This chapter will analyze the raw data produced by Janus 
and contained in Appendix B.  The intent of this analysis 
is to produce an interpretation of the data, which does not 
require an extensive background in operations research.  
Therefore, the central metric used to evaluate the extent 
to which one missile is better than the other is the mean 
of the MOEs analyzed. Additionally, standard deviation 
(SD), median, and the 95 percent confidence interval (CI) 
for each MOE will be provided. 
Data for analysis of each MOE were collected from 25 
simulation runs of each case.  The cases are identified as 
HF Baseline (Janus scenario 245), CM Direct Fire (Janus 
scenario 255), and CM Fire-and-Forget (Janus scenario 235). 
Several key factors should be considered prior to 
examining this analysis.  The data were analyzed 
considering all outliers.  Each run required Human-in-the-
Loop (HITL) interaction, but was limited to providing a 
“Go” command for the disaggregated unit movement from ABF 1 
to ABF 2. Both the HF Baseline and CM Direct Fire case were 
executed in an identical fashion.  A battlefield graphic is 
provided in Appendix D.  In the CM Fire-and-Forget case the 
HITL interaction required plotting the point of impact for 
each Fire-and-Forget missile launched. 
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The data analysis is broken down into two primary 
parts:  a statistical analysis, and an operational 
analysis.   
B. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
1. MOE 1 – Lethality 
Lethality is defined as the total number of threat 




















Figure 14.   Boxplot MOE 1 – Lethality. 
 
As depicted within this comparative boxplot, the 
number of OPFOR kills by missile type increases from the HF 
Baseline to the CM Direct Fire case.  These two initial 
cases reflect the employment of the missile using identical 
tactics and the missile in a direct fire mode only. 
Moreover, a marked increase in kills can be seen between 
the CM Direct Fire case and the CM Fire-and-Forget case.  
It follows that the CM Direct Fire case displays a 
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significant increase in kills when compared to the HF 
Baseline case.  
The CM Fire-and-Forget outliers are significant in 
that they show, in one case, that the potential of 32 kills 
out of 32 OPFOR entities does exists.  This highlights that 
tactics, which optimize the CM employment, have the 
potential of further shifting the mean OPFOR kills to this 
maximized number.  This opportunity was not evident in the 
data produced within the HF Baseline or CM Direct Fire 
cases. 
 
 n Mean SD Median 95% CI of Mean 
HF Baseline 25 19.5 2.18 20.0 18.6 to 20.4
CM Direct Fire 25 24.6 1.32 25.0 24.1 to 25.2
CM Fire-and-Forget 25 27.6 1.55 28.0 27.0 to 28.3
 
Table 1.   Descriptive Statistics for MOE 1 – Lethality. 
 
The descriptive statistics highlight the significant 
increase in mean kills between each missile type throughout 
each case.  The mean lethality increases by 5.1 OPFOR 
kills, or 26 percent, between the HF Baseline and CM Direct 
Fire cases.  The mean of the CM Fire-and-Forget case 
represents a 42 percent improvement over the HF Baseline 
case.  The 95 percent CI shows that, with a high level of 
certainty, CM will outperform HF in both DF and Fire-and-
Forget cases.  
2. MOE 2 – Survivability 
Survivability is defined as the total number of attack 


























Figure 15.   Boxplot MOE 2 – Survivability. 
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Survivability shows a marked improvement from the HF 
Baseline case to the CM Fire-and-Forget case.  The median 
number of helicopters killed is higher for the HF Baseline 
case and can be attributed primarily to the shorter 
effective range of the missile as compared to the CM.  The 
HF equipped helicopter must close within 8 km of its 
intended target and therefore tends to expose itself more 
often within the threat’s weapon system effective range.  
The CM firing helicopter, in both cases, benefits from the 
increased capability in effective range.  This allows the 
CM equipped aircraft additional time to identify, target, 
and eliminate high threat OPFOR equipment prior to closing 
within the OPFOR entities’ primary weapon’s system range 
(T-72, AT-11 missile effective range is 5 km).  [Ref. 23]  
The straight line representing the median and 
interquartiles of the CM Direct Fire case suggests that an 
extremely high level of confidence exists that the median 
number of helicopter kills depicted will occur.  The 
identification of observations of two helicopters killed 
and zero killed versus one have been labeled far outliers.  
This observation is deemed to be not significant.  The 
median of the CM Fire-and-Forget case suggests further 
improvement of survivability over the CM Direct Fire case 
and clearly suggests that the expected number of CM 
equipped aircraft killed during this scenario is less than 
one.  Overall, the CM in either direct fire or fire-and-
forget modes displays a significant improvement in 
survivability over the HF equipped helicopter. 
 
  n Mean SD Median 95% CI of Mean 
HF Baseline  25 1.92 1.38 2.00 1.35 to 2.49
CM Direct Fire  25 1.04 0.45 1.00 0.85 to 1.22
CM Fire-and-Forget  25 0.72 0.46 1.00 0.53 to 0.90
  
Table 2.   Descriptive Statistics for MOE 2 – 
Survivability. 
 
The descriptive statistics highlight the improved 
survivability of the Longbow Apache when employing the CM.  
When comparing the HF Baseline to the CM Direct Fire case, 
there is a 46 percent improvement when employing the CM.  
The CM Fire-and-Forget case shows a 63 percent improvement 
in survivability over the baseline case.  When examining 
the CM’s statistics, both the median and 95 percent CI 
point to expected loss rates within this deep attack 
scenario of one helicopter or less. 
3. MOE 3 – Engagement 
Engagement is defined as the average range of a shot, 



























Figure 16.   Boxplot MOE 3 – Engagement. 
 
  52
The significant increase in median kill range of the 
CM over the HF is highlighted with this measure.  An 
increase in observed outliers is evident within this graph.  
This increase can be attributed to variance generated by 
helicopter to target intervisibility. This has little to do 
with the actual missile’s performance, and more to do with 
helicopter position, flight profile, and atmospheric 
factors.  There is a slight decrease in average range to 
kill between the CM Direct Fire and Fire-and-Forget cases.  
This is attributed to the greater requirement for HITL 
participation with the CM Fire-and-Forget model.  The HITL 
aspect prevented engagement of targets by all aircraft 
simultaneously.  To further clarify this aspect, the HITL 
model required the operator to identify the target and plot 
the round, then move on to the next target.  The CM Direct 
Fire case is not hampered by this process and benefits from 
target acquisition and engagement driven by the model’s 
search and target acquisition algorithm only.  The slight 
decrease in engagement range between the two CM cases was 
an expected outcome due to the HITL process.  Overall, this 
graphical analysis of the CM shows a significant 
improvement in missile performance over the HF Baseline 
case. 
 
 n Mean SD Median 95% CI of Mean
HF Baseline 25 6.44 0.37 6.49 6.29 to 6.59
CM Direct Fire 25 9.31 0.48 9.21 9.12 to 9.50
CM Fire-and-Forget 25 8.77 0.51 8.72 8.56 to 8.97
  
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics MOE 3 – Engagement. 
 
The descriptive statistics show how an improved 
missile range was utilized when engaging enemy targets.  
The CM Direct Fire case shows a mean kill range increase of 
2.87 km over the HF Baseline case.  The extended kill range 
represents a 45 percent improvement, out of a possible 50 
percent, over the HF.  The CM Fire-and-Forget produces a 36 
percent improvement over HF. In the deep attack scenario, 
there is 95 percent confidence that the CM, fired in direct 
fire mode, will achieve a kill at a range between 9.12 km 
and 9.50 km.  During engagement, the HF missile used an 
average of 81 percent of its maximum range of 8 km.  The CM 
used an average of 78 percent of its maximum range of 12 
km.  This fact has implications regarding the value of 
adding additional range capability to the CM.  This 
analysis suggests adding additional range capability beyond 
9.31 kilometers will result, on average, in less than 
  53
maximum utilization of the capability.  This result could 
be due to the NOE flight profile used by helicopters.  The 
combination of low altitude and rolling terrain create a 
difficult environment for the aircraft’s optics or radar to 
achieve shooter to target intervisibility at long ranges.  
4. Additional Data Requirements 
Additional data requirements that support the 
evaluated MOEs are analyzed to provide added depth and 
benefit to the research. 
a. Kill Efficiency 
This metric is defined as the number of OPFOR 
killed divided by the number of missiles fired.  This 
measure provides additional insight on lethality and is of 
significant interest to the warfighter.  The raw data that 









Systems Killed 20 25 28 
Missiles Fired 34 32 46 
Kill Efficiency 57.98% 76.65% 61.23% 
 
Table 4.   Kill Efficiency. 
 
The CM Direct Fire case shows an 18.67 percent 
improvement in kill efficiency over the HF.  Again, the 
reduced improvement over HF seen in the CM Fire-and-Forget 
case can be attributed to the HITL.  Due to the manual 
plotting requirement of the fire-and-forget model and the 
relative speed of the game there was a greater tendency 
with a HITL to fire upon the same target from more than one 
helicopter.  This resulted in a greater number of missiles 
fired within the fire-and-forget case.  Overall, this 
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scenario shows a significant improvement in kill efficiency 
when employing the CM.  This improved efficiency is 
important to the warfighter, because it represents a 
reduction in resources required to accomplish this deep 
attack mission.  
b. Average OPFOR to Helicopter Kill Range 
This metric is defined, as the average OPFOR 
system to aircraft kill range.  This measure provides 
additional insight on the missile’s impact on aircraft 
survivability. 
 





Average Kill Range 3.50 3.36 2.56 
  
Table 5.   Average OPFOR to Helicopter Kill Range. 
 
The greater range to achieve a helicopter kill 
seen in the HF Baseline case can be attributed to the HF’s 
reduced capability to destroy high threat OPFOR systems at 
an extended range.  With these high threat systems still 
active as the ATKHC closes on the OPFOR position those 
systems prosecute their engagement at the maximum range 
possible.  The most effective OPFOR weapon system employed 
in this scenario was the AT-11, which is an anti-tank 
missile fired from the T-72 tank.  The progressively 
decreasing OPFOR to helicopter kill ranges seen in the two 
CM cases can be simply attributed to those systems that 
avoided being targeted by the CM at longer ranges.  Those 
OPFOR systems maintained their concealed positions until 
the CM equipped Longbow closed within their range fan.  
This finding highlights the capability of the CM to destroy 
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high threat OPFOR systems at a greater standoff range 
enhancing overall survivability.  It also depicts perceived 
lower threat targets as reason for leveraging the CM 
standoff by employing a limit of advance outside of the 
known threat systems maximum effective ranges. 
c. Average Minimum and Maximum Range to an 
OPFOR Kill 
This metric is defined as the average minimum and 









Minimum Range 3.19 5.90 4.64
Maximum Range 7.97 11.93 11.95
  
Table 6.   Average Minimum and Maximum Range to Kill. 
 
This metric supports MOE 3 – Engagement.  It 
shows a greater average minimum range to OPFOR kill or 
standoff for the CM as compared to the HF.  The average 
maximum range to a kill is nearly equivalent to the maximum 
effective range for both the HF and the CM models.  While 
an obvious increase in standoff is evident between the HF 
and CM, this increase in effectiveness can be attributed in 
part to the improved helicopter optics modeled on the CM 
equipped Longbow Apache.  To further justify this position, 
the CM has already proved its increased standoff at ranges 
within the optics capability of the HF equipped helicopter.  
Therefore, the increased average maximum kill range beyond 
the HF 8 km limitation, must be partially attributed to 




C. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The operational analysis is divided into two primary 
sections.  The first section is a quantitative approach 
used to plan attack helicopter operations called Engagement 
Area Calculus.  The second section is a qualitative 
approach titled Employment Analysis. 
1. Engagement Area Calculus   
Engagement Area Calculus is a tool utilized by the 
tactical planner of attack aviation operations to determine 
how many aircraft and munitions will be needed to achieve 
the commander’s intent.  This determination is largely 
based upon threat force size and the kill efficiency of the 
primary weapon system to be employed.  In this scenario, 
the commander’s intent is to destroy the MRL battalion and 
its attached units, which equates to 70 percent of the 
OPFOR systems or 22 out of 32 systems destroyed.  This 
analysis shows that when employing the CM versus the HF 
missile there is a significant difference in the resources 
required to accomplish this destruction mission.  The CM 
Fire-and-Forget case will be analyzed, but will not be 
directly compared to the HF Baseline case in this portion 
of the analysis.  The fire-and-forget case is intended to 
layer the CM’s capabilities for analysis and depict 
incremental improvement, but due to subtle differences in 
the execution of the scenario will not be used for an 
operational comparison. This operational analysis includes 
a comparison of the number of missiles required per missile 
type to achieve the commander’s intent for this deep attack 
mission (22/32 OPFOR killed), the expected number of kills 
for an ATKHC equipped with each missile type, and a 
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planning calculation focused on determining how many 
aircraft would be required to destroy all of the OPFOR 
vehicles in this scenario.  
The number of missiles required to achieve the 
commander’s intent is a critical consideration for the 
warfighter.  This information supports both tactical and 
unit resource decisions.  In this analysis, the commander’s 
intent to destroy the equivalent of 70 percent of the OPFOR 
unit is a threshold.  The objective of destroying 100 









Vehicles to Destroy 22 22 22
Missile Kill Efficiency 57.98% 76.65% 61.23%
Number of Missiles Required 38 29 36
  
Table 7.   Missiles Required to Kill 70 Percent of OPFOR. 
 
When comparing the HF Baseline against the CM Direct 
Fire case, the CM equipped ATKHC shows a 35% decrease in 
missiles required to achieve the commander’s intent. This 
frees valuable resources to be applied elsewhere on the 
battlefield in support of the division commander’s intent.  
The expected number of kills for an ATKHC equipped 
with each missile type is a critical figure for the attack 
aviation planner.  The next analysis differentiates the 
combat power of the ATKHC equipped by each of these 
missiles through highlighting potential combat power.  This 
analysis examines the number of kills each company is 
expected to accomplish based on kill efficiency.  These 
calculations are based upon an ATKHC of 8 aircraft equipped 
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with 16 missiles for a total of 128 missiles.  These 









Number of Missiles Available 128 128 128
Missile Kill Efficiency 57.98% 76.65% 61.23%
Expected Number of Kills 74 98 78
 
Table 8.   Expected Number of OPFOR Kills by the ATKHC. 
 
Regardless of the missile type the ATKHC assigned the 
deep attack mission for this scenario was potentially 
capable of completing the stated commander’s intent 100 
percent of the time.  The ATKHC armed with the CM realized 
a 32 percent increase in combat power over the HF equipped 
company.  In other words, the CM equipped unit has a higher 
expected number of kills than the HF unit. 
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The deep operations planner would certainly plan to 
achieve the threshold or commander’s intent of 70 percent 
of the OPFOR force, but many other variables must be 
considered in determining the resources required to 
accomplish the mission.  The potential to destroy 100 
percent of the OPFOR force is always desirable and must be 
considered by the planner.  Moreover, potential loss of 
aircraft enroute to the ABF position must be considered 
during planning.  While enroute losses go beyond the scope 
of this research, a safe assumption is that employing a 
unit capable of destroying 100 percent of the force has a 
higher probability of achieving the threshold of 70 
percent, especially when considering the effects of unknown 
losses.  To determine the resources required to accomplish 
the assigned mission, the number of OPFOR vehicles on the 
battlefield was utilized to determine the friendly 
resources required.  This analysis shows that less aircraft 
could be employed to accomplish this mission for both the 
HF and CM equipped units.  Furthermore, when compared to 
the HF Baseline case, less CM equipped aircraft are 









Vehicles to Destroy 32 32 32
Missile Kill Efficiency 57.98% 76.65% 61.23%
Number of Missiles Required 55 42 52
Missiles per Aircraft 16 16 16
Number of Aircraft Required 3.45 2.61 3.27
  
Table 9.   Aircraft Required to Kill 100 Percent of the 
OPFOR. 
 
This research employs a small sample size. Therefore 
the decrease in the number of aircraft required to 
accomplish this mission may not seem significant, but apply 
this improvement to a corps attack helicopter regiment, and 
the savings in resources are tremendous.  Overall, 24 
percent less CM equipped aircraft (HF Baseline versus CM 
Direct Fire) are required to accomplish this mission.  When 
employing a corps attack regiment of 48 aircraft to 
accomplish a series of troop (company level) deep attack 
missions, this represents 12 less aircraft required.  Those 
12 aircraft can be employed by the corps commander to 
execute nearly 5 additional company sized deliberate 





2. Employment Analysis 
This analysis is qualitative in nature and is based 
upon the author’s interpretation of the data and observing 
the simulated battlefield during each of these cases.   
By analyzing the CM capabilities in a layered manner, 
the contribution of each of these attributes can be better 
determined.  Taking that into account, it is the range of 
the CM, not the fire-and-forget capability that is 
attributed with the improved performance of the missile 
during this research.  The CM produced a 45 percent 
increase in average kill range over the HF.  The increase 
in average number of kills from CM Direct Fire to CM Fire-
and-Forget case was 12 percent and actually showed a slight 
decrease in average kill range of .54 km.  The improvement 
in range directly impacted the survivability of the Longbow 
Apache.  When armed with the CM, the survivability of the 
Longbow Apache increased by 46 percent.  Survivability 
equates to preserving combat power for future engagements 
and is of the utmost importance to the attack planner.  
This analysis points to the range of the CM being the most 
significant and beneficial performance parameter to the 
warfighter. 
The fire-and-forget capability of the CM may be both a 
boon and a bane to the ATKHC commander.  The CM Fire-and-
Forget case suggests that fire distribution or fire control 
is impacted by the use of CM.  The potential exists to fire 
a fire-and-forget missile at a massed target and rely upon 
the missiles capabilities to provide the terminal guidance, 
inducing an increased possibility of multiple rounds 
impacting the same target.  A capability to prevent this 
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from happening was not incorporated into the modeled CM.  
Therefore, this problem is partially due to the nature of 
the model and the simulation, but has some valid basis for 
concern in live employment.  It is important to note that 
this is not a problem unique to CM.  Fire distribution 
problems exist today in units employing the HF in both 
remote and direct fire modes, but the fire-and-forget 
technology has the potential to exacerbate this problem if 
not addressed early in the program.  Overall, this is a 
concern to be addressed during requirements definition or 
concept exploration, but not one that can be determined to 
significantly degrade performance below that of HF. 
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The fire-and-forget aspect of the CM also may impact 
the commander’s ability to retrieve battle damage 
assessment (BDA) at mission completion.  This is largely 
due to the fact that CM can provide its own terminal 
guidance, and in high threat situations the Longbow Apache 
may employ the CM without eyes on the target through 
impact.  Examples of this type of engagement could be 
firing on the move at air-defense threats enroute to the 
ABF position or firing into a deep attack EA utilizing 
target reference points without eyes on target.  The latter 
could be due to intervisibility problems between shooter 
and target over the extremely long-range of the CM. Without 
an accurate BDA, it is extremely difficult for the unit 
commander to make a determination of mission success or the 
need for a re-attack.  There are possible solutions to this 
problem such as utilizing a sensor other than the Longbow 
Apache to determine BDA.  Within the context of this 
scenario, by employing the assets available to the attack 
helicopter battalion through the division and by utilizing 
current tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the 
Longbow Apache Company, the potential of producing this 
result exists.  Taking these unmitigated potential outcomes 
into account, the CM may produce; a more difficult 
environment for the battlefield commander to assess battle 
damage as compared to the current HF equipped ATKHC.   
The last CM employment concern is the potential for 
fratricide with a missile of this design.  The modeled 
missile is optimized for a deliberate attack behind the 
enemy front line trace.  The capability to produce 
fratricide in this research was zero, because the 
fratricide was not enabled within the simulation and no 
friendly ground units were employed.  In a direct fire mode 
the missile does not have any greater potential than the HF 
in inducing fratricide.  When relying on the fire-and-
forget capabilities of the missile in an environment where 
friendly ground forces are actively engaging OPFOR in a 
direct fire engagement or the close fight, the potential of 
fratricide may be increased. This is largely due to the 
fact the CM will provide its own terminal guidance to 
target.  This could produce fratricide if friendly ground 
forces and OPFOR were engaged in close combat within the 
missile’s terminal footprint.  This problem may be 
compounded by the fact that no current air-to-ground 
identification system exists that would prevent a fire-and-
forget missile from mistakenly engaging a friendly ground 
element.  With these unmitigated possibilities taken into 
account, an unknown, but potentially greater risk for 
fratricide exists with the CM over the HF. 
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The potential issues generated from this employment 
analysis may all be mitigated through new tactics and 
technology.  Fire distribution and fire control will have 
to be addressed by the warfighter to provide a workable 
solution to this potential problem.  The collection of the 
BDA can be solved through both a technological and tactical 
approach.  New or existing sensors can be employed to 
gather the CM produced BDA or tactics, techniques, and 
procedures can be developed to retrieve this data with the 
ATKHC’s organic systems. Fratricide must be addressed and 
is the most difficult issue to mitigate.  Potential 
solutions exist in technology and tactics, but in the end 
must be considered thoroughly before employing any fire-
and-forget missile within the close fight. 
In summary, taking these basic employment concerns 
outlined above into consideration, the benefits of extended 
range and greater lethality brought to the battlefield by 
CM far surpasses those of the HF missile.  The statistical 
analysis and operational analysis of CM within this 
research scenario points to a tactical missile capability 
that will result in increased attack aviation survivability 
and significantly increased lethality.  Conclusions and 
recommendations concerning these findings will be further 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The CM shows significant improvement over the HF in 
lethality, survivability, and engagement within this Janus 
deep attack scenario.  Furthermore, the increased 
capability of CM results in significant resource savings 
for the tactical commander.  The resource savings represent 
combat power, which may be applied elsewhere in the battle 
space by the warfighter.   
Table 10 depicts the answer to this thesis’ primary 
research question, “Using the Janus Combat Model, which 
missile is the best operational alternative for Army 
Aviation and to what extent is it better?” 
 
  Improvement
MOE 1 - Lethality 26%
MOE 2 - Survivability 46%
MOE 3 - Engagement 45%
  
Table 10.   Extent of CM Direct Fire Improvement Over HF. 
 
Table 11 depicts the extent of resource savings 











Number of Missiles 




Number of Kills 32%
Number of Aircraft 




Table 11.   Extent of Resource Savings of CM Over HF. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To enhance the validity of these results and add to 
the body of knowledge required to make a milestone decision 
for this missile, the CM model in Janus should be updated 
with classified data.  Each scenario should be rerun to 
produce new data.  This data would then provide more 
accurate insight regarding the use of the CM in an Army 
Aviation deep attack scenario. 
Recommendations concerning the establishment of 
operational requirements and a baseline model for the CM 
include: 
• For the capabilities of the CM to be fully 
realized by the legacy force, to include the 
Longbow Apache, the optics of these platforms 
will be the key limitation. Without benefit of 
improved optics both survivability and engagement 
will be equivalent to the HF baseline. Existing 
and future programs intending to employ this 
missile must consider this fact and the 
associated cost when designing new systems or 
enhancing existing platform optics. 
• Fratricide prevention must be considered when 
determining the final requirement for fire-and-
forget capabilities of the missile.  The 
potential for fratricide could be reduced through 
hardware or software protocol designed into the 
missile.  Employing fratricide-minimizing 
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techniques, tactics, and procedures solely would 
be an unacceptable solution to this potential 
problem, especially when considering the demands 
of the close fight. 
The recommendations for the changes to the Janus 
database include: 
• Develop a new scenario that incorporates a larger 
OPFOR and employs an Army aviation attack 
battalion to produce results meaningful to corps 
and division commanders. 
• Increase the number of runs or eliminate the 
requirement for HITL to provide for a better 
analysis of variability. 
• Employ the CM against an increasingly lethal 
OPFOR to include tanks employing reactive armor.  
Additionally, include OPFOR counter-measures to 
impact the effectiveness of the infrared, 
millimeter wave, and laser seeker capabilities 
employed by the CM. 
C. ANSWERS TO SUBSIDIARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Utilizing tactics modified to take advantage of CM's 
new technological attributes, which missile is more 
effective and to what extent? 
The CM Direct Fire case shows significant improvement 
in all MOEs over the HF Baseline case.  Clearly the CM in a 
direct fire mode outperformed the HF.  With the addition 
layering of fire-and-forget technology over the direct fire 
case, the improvement over the HF shows additional increase 
in missile effectiveness in all but MOE 3 - Engagement.  
Again, this conclusion must be tempered with the 
explanation of the added HITL requirement for the CM Fire-
and-Forget case.  The extent of this increase in missile 





MOE 1 - Lethality 42%
MOE 2 - Survivability 63%
MOE 3 - Engagement 36%
 
Table 12.   CM Fire-and-Forget Improvement Over HF. 
 
What tactical benefits does the CM and attack aviation 
combination bring to the battlefield? 
The single greatest advantage to attack aviation 
brought to the battlefield by the CM is its increased 
standoff or engagement range.  This increased capability 
contributes greatly to the survivability of the attack 
helicopter and in the end preserves a greater amount of 
combat power than the HF for future employment.  This 
ability to preserve combat power coupled with the increased 
lethality of the missile makes it an optimal primary 
missile for Army attack aviation. 
How can Janus results be useful and its results 
meaningful to a Program Manager (PM)? 
How meaningful the results produced by Janus is 
largely dependent upon the research analyst’s thoroughness 
in developing the applied scenario, weapon model, and 
analytical framework for the study.  Before the results 
should be utilized by the PM he must fully understand the 
assumptions utilized by the research analyst during the 
development of the scenario and model, as well as the basic 
Janus Combat Model limitations.  The CM modeled within this 
study employs an assumed probability of kill for the 
concept missile.  A decrease in this assumed probability 
could result in the baseline alternative being the best 
solution to this requirement.  This assumption and several 
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other critical design specifications greatly affect the 
final outcome of this research.  Understanding these design 
assumptions is critical to understanding this study.  The 
database values, which support the design assumptions, are 
contained within the Appendix A.  If the results derived 
from Janus are used without this foreknowledge, the PM may 
be making a decision based upon data, which has been 
synthesized in a manner that does not adequately support 
his program’s needs or the overall decision-making process.  
With careful consideration of all of these factors the 
results of a study employing Janus may be used in support 
of program decisions. 
Janus results can be useful to the PM throughout the 
life cycle of a system, but it is particularly useful 
during requirements development and concept exploration 
phases.  One of the PM’s greatest concerns is resolving 
system requirements when the design required to achieve 
desired performance is not feasible in terms of cost, 
performance, or schedule. [Ref. 18]  Since Janus is 
accessible at most TRADOC facilities and many acquisition 
centers, it is an effective means to determine the most 
cost-effective requirements for a given concept.  Janus 
also is a highly beneficial bridging tool between the user 
representative and the project office.  Janus can aid the 
PM in his collaborative efforts to develop team 
understanding of the costs associated with desired 
capability.  Janus allows the user representative in 
concert with the program office to develop the best 
solution for the warfighter, while considering cost through 
capability tradeoffs within a given scenario. 
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Janus can be a key tool to support daily operations in 
any acquisition project office. The ability for a PM to 
turn to his lead engineer and have a scenario quickly run 
with a pre-defined model to see the effects of new or 
removed capabilities can be a powerful tool.  This 
capability can provide additional justification at short 
notice for the expenditure, acquisition or defense of 
project funds.  
D. SUGGESTED AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following are potential areas of future research 
based upon the findings of this study: 
• Evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the key 
performance parameters and other operational 
requirements stated for this missile.  How much 
does the additional lethality, survivability, or 
engagement capability cost? 
• Study the effects of the CM on force 
effectiveness on a larger scale.  Develop a new 
scenario, which incorporates a larger OPFOR and 
employs an Army attack battalion to produce 
results meaningful to corps and division 
commanders.  How much more combat effectiveness 
does the CM and attack aviation combination bring 
to the battle as compared to existing systems? 
• Examine the effects of the fire-and-forget 
technology employed with this missile in the 
close fight.  The intent would be to analyze the 
need for a design requirement, which would 
minimize fratricide when employing the CM from 
attack aviation. 
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APPENDIX A.  SYSTEMS DATABASE 
This appendix outlines the system specifications 
utilized to model the entities within Scenario 235, 245, 
and 255.  This appendix provides data for both friendly 
(Blue forces) and OPFOR systems (Red forces). 





























15 AH-64DCM 200 20.0 12.0 4 2 100 1.00 44 126 0
05 AH-64D 200 9.0 8.0 4 2 100 1.00 44 126 0
FRIENDLY SYSTEMS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
 
 























15 AH-64DCM 1 3 64 4
05 AH-64D 1 3 64 4
FRIENDLY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
 
 
Sys Num Sys Name
(Meters) 





15 AH-64DCM 15.84 2.03 3.84 12 18 12
05 AH-64D 15.84 2.03 3.84 12 18
DETECT Dimensions SENSORS






Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 1.179 0.009 11 7.948 0.361
2 1.783 0.013 12 8.477 0.522
3 2.471 0.019 13 8.87 0.756
4 3.237 0.027 14 9.107 1.093
5 4.005 0.039 15 9.332 1.580
6 4.754 0.057 16 9.545 2.286
7 5.470 0.083 17 9.745 3.306
8 6.145 0.119 18 9.937 4.781
9 6.782 0.173 19 10.117 6.914
10 7.384 0.250 20 10.290 10.000
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Sensor Number:  12
 
 
Sys Num Optical Contrast Exposed Defilade
15 0.200 3.418 3.418
05 0.200 3.418 3.418
Thermal Contrast
OPTICAL AND THERMAL CONTRAST DATA
 
 
Sensor Num Narrow Wide Narrow-to-Wide Factor Spectral Band (1,2 = Optical  3,4 = Thermal)
12 3.00 10.05 0.29851 4
12 3.00 10.05 0.29851 4
FOV-(Degrees)
SENSOR FIELD of VIEW (FOV) and BAND
 
 
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 1.179 0.009 11 7.948 0.361
2 1.783 0.013 12 8.477 0.522
3 2.471 0.019 13 8.87 0.756
4 3.237 0.027 14 9.107 1.093
5 4.005 0.039 15 9.332 1.580
6 4.754 0.057 16 9.545 2.286
7 5.470 0.083 17 9.745 3.306
8 6.145 0.119 18 9.937 4.781
9 6.782 0.173 19 10.117 6.914
10 7.384 0.250 20 10.290 10.000
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST














Rel Wpn/Ord to use 
if Ammo Expended 
(1-15)
6 14 Wpn 14 16 0.0
Wpn/Ord Number














Rel Wpn/Ord to use 
if Ammo Expended 
(1-15)
6 28 CM DF 16
Wpn/Ord Number



























14 Wpn 14 6.0 6.0 120.0 1 16 0.400 5




Fire on:     0 = Yes, no restrictions.       1 = Stop, can move before impact












14 Wpn 14 2 2
28 CM DF 1 2










PH     
Data Set
PK     
Data Set
389 T72 549 549
358 ZSU-23-4 549 549
95 BM21 549 549









PH     
Data Set
PK     
Data Set
389 T72 100 100
358 ZSU-23-4 100 100
95 BM21 100 100
HIT and KILL DATA SET Numbers for Friendly Weapon CM DF
 
 
Range(m)--> 650 2500 4000 5500 8000
Posture:
SSDF 0.89420 0.91360 0.89060 0.80500 0.63660
SSDH 0.89550 0.91390 0.89340 0.80050 0.60170
SSEF 0.89420 0.91360 0.89060 0.80500 0.63660
SSEH 0.89550 0.91390 0.89340 0.80050 0.60170
SMDF (not used) 0.89420 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SMDH (not used) 0.89550 0.91390 0.89340 0.80050 0.60170
SMEF 0.89420 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000













Range(m)--> 500 3000 6000 9000 12000
Posture:
SSDF 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SSDH 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SSEF 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SSEH 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SMDF (not used) 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SMDH (not used) 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000
SMEF 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000 0.94000









PROBABILITY of HIT Data Set: 0100
 
 
Range(m)--> 650 2500 4000 5500 8000
Posture:
M/ DF 0.74800 0.76970 0.73840 0.69150 0.66640
M/ DH 0.66580 0.69280 0.68680 0.65860 0.61980
M/ EF 0.74800 0.76970 0.73840 0.69150 0.66640
M/ EH 0.66580 0.69280 0.68680 0.65860 0.61980
PROBABILITY of KILL Data Set: 0549
 
 
Range(m)--> 500 3000 6000 9000 12000
Posture:
M/ DF 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000
M/ DH 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000
M/ EF 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000
M/ EH 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000 0.80000


































389 T72 60 6.0 5.0 2 3 50 1.00 66 122
358 ZSU-23-4 50 6.0 3.0 10 4 500 0.80 109 123
95 BM21 60 3.0 3 3 100 1.00 116 125
OPFOR SYSTEMS GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
 
 























389 T72 3 1 2 3
358 ZSU-23-4 4 1 2 19
95 BM21 5 2 1
OPFOR SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
 
 
Sys Num Sys Name
(Meters) 





389 T72 5.48 3.15 2.25 23 37 17 1
358 ZSU-23-4 6.54 2.25 2.95 7 17
95 BM21 7.42 2.50 3.05 1 1
DETECT Dimensions SENSORS
OPFOR SYSTEMS DETECTION DATA
 
 
Sys Num Optical Contrast Exposed Defilade
389 0.360 2.000 0.500
358 0.350 4.084 1.000
95 0.360 2.000 0.500
Thermal Contrast











(1,2 = Optical  
3,4 = Thermal)
23 15.00 1
7 3.60 13.30 0.26670 4
1 10.00 1
FOV-(Degrees)
SENSOR FIELD of VIEW (FOV) and BAND
 
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.000 0.020 11 10.620 0.400
2 3.816 0.030 12 10.950 0.450
3 4.776 0.040 13 11.256 0.500
4 5.400 0.050 14 11.544 0.550
5 7.128 0.100 15 11.814 0.600
6 8.112 0.150 16 12.072 0.650
7 8.814 0.200 17 12.318 0.700
8 9.378 0.250 18 12.792 0.800
9 9.846 0.300 19 13.248 0.900
10 10.254 0.350 20 13.686 1.000
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST
Sensor Number:  23
 
 
Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.969 0.010 11 6.054 0.367
2 1.446 0.014 12 6.462 0.527
3 1.974 0.020 13 6.849 0.758
4 2.540 0.029 14 7.217 1.089
5 3.098 0.042 15 7.567 1.565
6 3.650 0.060 16 7.772 2.249
7 4.185 0.086 17 7.942 3.231
8 4.688 0.124 18 8.108 4.643
9 5.164 0.178 19 8.261 6.671
10 5.621 0.255 20 8.413 9.586
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST




Pair Cycles TMP/CON Pair Cycles TMP/CON
1 0.000 0.020 11 1.787 0.400
2 0.650 0.030 12 1.842 0.450
3 0.810 0.040 13 1.893 0.500
4 0.914 0.050 14 1.941 0.550
5 1.204 0.100 15 1.986 0.600
6 1.367 0.150 16 2.029 0.650
7 1.485 0.200 17 2.071 0.700
8 1.579 0.250 18 2.150 0.800
9 1.657 0.300 19 2.226 0.900
10 1.726 0.350 20 2.299 1.000
CYCLES per MILLIRADIAN versus TEMPERATURE or CONTRAST













Rel Wpn/Ord to use 
if Ammo Expended 
(1-15)
10 378 AT-11 6 2.0 13
13 381 125APFSDS 12 2.0 10
Wpn/Ord Number














Rel Wpn/Ord to use 
if Ammo Expended 
(1-15)
2 392 HE-T 23mm 1500 2.0 3
3 393 API-T 23 mm 500 2.0 2
Wpn/Ord Number

























378 AT-11 6.9 3.0 10.0 1 7 0.350 5
381 125APFSDS 9.0 4.5 10.0 1 1 1.700 5
392 HE-T 23mm 8.3 2.7 120 20 25 0.89 5





Fire on:     0 = Yes, no restrictions.       1 = Stop, can move before impact












378 AT-11 2 1
381 125APFSDS
392 HE-T 23mm 1
393 API-T 23 mm 1








PH     
Data Set
PK     
Data Set
5 AH-64D 741 741
15 AH-64DCM 741 741








PH     
Data Set
PK     
Data Set
5 AH-64D 722 722
15 AH-64DCM 722 722









PH     
Data Set
PK     
Data Set
5 AH-64D 649 649
15 AH-64DCM 649 649










PH     
Data Set
PK     
Data Set
5 AH-64D 645 645
15 AH-64DCM 645 645
HIT and KILL DATA SET Numbers for OPFOR Weapon API-T 23mm
 
Range(m)--> 250 1375 2250 3125 5000
Posture:
SSDF 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
SSDH 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
SSEF 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
SSEH 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
SMDF (not used) 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
SMDH (not used) 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000
SMEF 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000 0.95000













Range(m)--> 1 1075 2050 3025 4000
Posture:
SSDF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSDH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSEH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMDF (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMDH (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMEH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MSDF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MSDH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MSEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MSEH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MMDF (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MMDH (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MMEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
MMEH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000




Range(m)--> 1 1000 1500 2000 2500
Posture:
SSDF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSDH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSEH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMDF (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMDH (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000









PROBABILITY of HIT Data Set: 649
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Range(m)--> 1 1125 1750 2375 3000
Posture:
SSDF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSDH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SSEH 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMDF (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMDH (not used) 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000
SMEF 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000 1.00000









PROBABILITY of HIT Data Set: 645
 
 
Range(m)--> 250 1375 2250 3125 5000
Posture:
MOBDF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
MOBDH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
MOBEF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
MOBEH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
FRPDF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
FRPDH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
FRPEF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
FRPEH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
M/ DF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
M/ DH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
M/ EF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
M/ EH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
KK DF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
KK DH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860
KK EF 0.67010 0.66940 0.66950 0.66990 0.66860
KK EH 0.61010 0.60930 0.60950 0.60990 0.60860














M/ DF 0.97380 0.64230 0.38860 0.24300 0.16060
M/ DH 0.96410 0.58530 0.34010 0.20900 0.13680
M/ EF 0.97380 0.64230 0.38860 0.24300 0.16060





PROBABILITY of KILL Data Set: 0722
 
 
Range(m)--> 1 1000 1500 2000 2500
Posture:
MOBDF 0.01050 0.00270 0.00120 0.00070 0.00040
MOBDH 0.00860 0.00220 0.00100 0.00060 0.00040
MOBEF 0.01050 0.00270 0.00120 0.00070 0.00040
MOBEH 0.00860 0.00220 0.00100 0.00060 0.00040
FRPDF 0.01260 0.00330 0.00150 0.00090 0.00050
FRPDH 0.01050 0.00280 0.00120 0.00070 0.00050
FRPEF 0.01260 0.00330 0.00150 0.00090 0.00050
FRPEH 0.01050 0.00280 0.00120 0.00070 0.00050
M/ DF 0.04420 0.01750 0.00900 0.00540 0.00360
M/ DH 0.03950 0.01530 0.00790 0.00470 0.00310
M/ EF 0.04420 0.01750 0.00900 0.00540 0.00360









Range(m)- 1 1125 1750 2375 3000
Posture:
MOBDF 0.03520 0.00720 0.00290 0.00150 0.00090
MOBDH 0.02930 0.00590 0.00230 0.00120 0.00070
MOBEF 0.03520 0.00720 0.00290 0.00150 0.00090
MOBEH 0.02930 0.00590 0.00230 0.00120 0.00070
FRPDF 0.04160 0.00870 0.00350 0.00180 0.00110
FRPDH 0.03520 0.00730 0.00290 0.00150 0.00090
FRPEF 0.04160 0.00870 0.00350 0.00180 0.00110
FRPEH 0.03520 0.00730 0.00290 0.00150 0.00090
M/ DF 0.18390 0.05730 0.02520 0.01360 0.00840
M/ DH 0.16320 0.04960 0.02170 0.01170 0.00720
M/ EF 0.18390 0.05730 0.02520 0.01360 0.00840





PROBABILITY of KILL Data Set: 645
 
  84
APPENDIX B.  DATA 
This appendix provides the raw data generated by the 
Janus post processor reports from scenarios 235 (CM Fire-
and-Forget), 245 (HF Baseline), and 255 (CM Direct Fire).  
The data is provided in two formats.  First, a synthesized 
format is presented, which was utilized with the Analyze-it 
Excel add-in for the studies primary statistical analysis.  
Second, it is provided in a raw data format as it was taken 
from the Janus reports.  This appendix provides data for 
both friendly (Blue forces) and OPFOR systems (Red forces). 
A. SYNTHESIZED DATA 
MOE 1 MOE 1 - Lethality
HF Baseline CM Direct Fire CM Fire and Forget
Run Systems Killed Missiles Fired Kill Efficiency Systems Killed Missiles Fired Kill Efficiency Systems Killed Missiles Fired Kill Efficiency
1 22 26 84.62% 23 31 74.19% 28 51 54.90%
2 18 36 50.00% 25 34 73.53% 30 44 68.18%
3 20 34 58.82% 26 30 86.67% 28 48 58.33%
4 17 30 56.67% 24 29 82.76% 27 56 48.21%
5 17 41 41.46% 24 29 82.76% 29 48 60.42%
6 19 34 55.88% 25 29 86.21% 28 45 62.22%
7 14 29 48.28% 25 31 80.65% 28 53 52.83%
8 24 39 61.54% 22 27 81.48% 28 47 59.57%
9 20 31 64.52% 24 33 72.73% 28 42 66.67%
10 21 46 45.65% 23 28 82.14% 32 44 72.73%
11 17 34 50.00% 24 37 64.86% 27 40 67.50%
12 20 32 62.50% 26 31 83.87% 25 49 51.02%
13 21 40 52.50% 23 34 67.65% 28 45 62.22%
14 20 33 60.61% 26 34 76.47% 27 43 62.79%
15 21 38 55.26% 26 32 81.25% 28 51 54.90%
16 19 37 51.35% 22 36 61.11% 26 47 55.32%
17 21 41 51.22% 25 34 73.53% 28 45 62.22%
18 20 30 66.67% 27 37 72.97% 26 48 54.17%
19 19 28 67.86% 26 31 83.87% 28 43 65.12%
20 20 36 55.56% 25 34 73.53% 25 35 71.43%
21 22 30 73.33% 25 33 75.76% 29 46 63.04%
22 21 34 61.76% 26 35 74.29% 27 36 75.00%
23 16 29 55.17% 24 31 77.42% 26 43 60.47%
24 21 36 58.33% 25 31 80.65% 29 43 67.44%
25 18 30 60.00% 25 38 65.79% 26 48 54.17%
Average 20 34 58% 25 32 77% 28 46 61% 
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MOE 1 MOE 2 - Survivability
MOE 1  HF Baseline CM Direct Fire CM Fire and Forget
Run Helicopters Killed Average Kill Range Helicopters Killed Average Kill Range Helicopters Killed Average Kill Range
1 1.000 4.320 1.000 3.590 1.000 2.671
2 5.000 3.435 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
3 1.000 4.839 1.000 3.590 1.000 2.949
4 3.000 4.053 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.590
5 2.000 3.585 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.590
6 3.000 4.129 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
7 2.000 4.030 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
8 0.000 0.000 2.000 4.061 1.000 3.590
9 1.000 3.251 1.000 3.590 0.000 0.000
10 1.000 4.847 1.000 3.590 0.000 0.000
11 2.000 4.795 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
12 4.000 3.356 1.000 3.590 0.000 0.000
13 1.000 4.845 2.000 4.061 1.000 3.590
14 1.000 3.158 1.000 2.671 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.590 1.000 4.533
16 0.000 0.000 2.000 4.061 1.000 3.590
17 3.000 3.755 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
18 1.000 4.560 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
19 4.000 3.652 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
20 1.000 4.890 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
21 3.000 3.446 1.000 3.590 0.000 0.000
22 2.000 3.991 1.000 3.590 0.000 0.000
23 2.000 3.174 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
24 1.000 3.205 1.000 4.630 0.000 0.000
25 4.000 4.157 1.000 3.590 1.000 3.590
Average 1.920 3.499 1.040 3.364 0.720 2.560  
 
MOE 3 MOE 3 -  Engagement
MOE 3  Hellfire Base Case CM Direct Fire CM Fire and Forget
Run Min Kill Range Avg Kill Range Max Kill Range Min Kill Range Avg Kill Range Max Kill Range Min Kill Range Avg Kill Range Max Kill Range
1 4.019 6.438 7.938 6.866 11.276 11.944 3.81 8.993 11.95
2 3.485 6.527 7.969 7.232 9.496 11.949 4.37 8.914 11.989
3 3.45 6.784 7.997 6.386 9.382 11.983 4.05 8.22 12.4
4 2.52 5.229 7.964 6.717 9.188 11.983 4.53 8.975 11.949
5 3.832 6.086 7.953 6.717 9.188 11.983 4.77 10.168 11.949
6 2.97 6.752 7.998 6.436 9.212 11.564 4.53 8.451 11.883
7 1.571 6.316 7.987 5.679 9.42 11.936 4.81 8.213 11.966
8 3.277 6.785 7.97 6.272 9.042 11.956 5.04 8.285 11.944
9 2.815 7.338 7.969 6.339 9.19 11.945 5.04 8.8 11.949
10 3.972 6.592 8.108 4.7 9.265 11.983 4.77 8.472 11.97
11 3.575 6.55 7.997 6.147 8.832 11.933 5.04 9.226 11.933
12 4.69 6.712 7.982 6.055 9.472 11.949 3.98 8.615 11.586
13 3.471 6.586 7.948 5.947 9.192 11.911 4.77 8.5 11.983
14 3.158 6.341 7.997 3.709 8.802 11.97 4.674 8.312 11.933
15 2.126 6.066 7.918 4.506 9.664 11.949 4.53 8.873 11.938
16 3.325 6.369 7.995 6.391 9.405 11.911 4.8 8.607 11.945
17 3.064 6.637 7.999 5.565 9.325 11.983 4.8 8.566 11.945
18 4.363 6.59 7.951 6.118 9.184 11.983 4.77 9.224 11.949
19 3.925 6.537 7.982 6.819 9.632 11.949 4.85 8.974 11.914
20 2.028 6.492 7.951 4.915 9.196 11.954 4.53 8.715 11.922
21 1.747 6.34 7.977 5.376 9.08 11.949 4.81 9.105 11.98
22 1.851 6.208 7.997 4.3 8.63 11.911 4.524 8.285 11.909
23 3.1 6.08 7.852 6.436 9.238 11.787 4.74 9.614 11.933
24 2.91 6.357 7.906 5.36 9.051 11.922 4.8 9.283 11.949
25 4.411 6.34 7.97 6.436 9.458 11.949 4.655 7.838 11.944








B. RAW DATA 
1. Scenario 245 (HF Baseline)  
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Run Kills Avg KR Max KR Min KR Shots Wt. Avg KR AVG KR
1
BM-21 11 6.024 7.911 4.019 13 66.264
T72 7 6.468 7.919 4.799 8 45.276
ZSU-23-4 4 7.525 7.938 7.013 5 30.1
2 22 7.938 4.019 26 6.438
BM-21 7 5.977 7.906 4.402 17 41.839
T72 7 7.151 7.969 4.802 9 50.057
ZSU-23-4 4 6.397 7.951 3.485 10 25.588
3 18 7.969 3.485 36 6.527
BM-21 8 7.364 7.997 4.628 16 58.912
T72 8 5.867 7.96 3.45 13 46.936
ZSU-23-4 4 7.459 7.951 7.095 5 29.836
4 20 7.997 3.45 34 6.784
BM-21 7 6.375 7.964 2.52 9 44.625
T72 6 6.675 7.946 3.312 11 19.872
ZSU-23-4 4 6.099 7.23 4.85 10 24.396
5 17 7.964 2.52 30 5.229
BM-21 9 5.614 7.953 3.832 19 50.526
T72 4 6.305 7.526 4.835 12 25.22
ZSU-23-4 4 6.929 7.897 4.815 10 27.716
6 17 7.953 3.832 41 6.086
BM-21 9 6.759 7.997 4.365 14 60.831
T72 6 6.359 7.998 2.97 15 38.154
ZSU-23-4 4 7.326 7.951 6.766 5 29.304
7 19 7.998 2.97 34 6.752
BM-21 5 6.741 7.987 4.705 13 33.705
T72 5 5.373 7.982 1.571 10 26.865
ZSU-23-4 4 6.963 7.951 5.884 6 27.852
8 14 7.987 1.571 29 6.316
BM-21 12 6.631 7.948 3.277 22 79.572
T72 8 6.981 7.97 5.065 12 55.848
ZSU-23-4 4 6.854 7.193 6.434 5 27.416
9 24 7.97 3.277 39 6.785
BM-21 10 6.57 7.945 4.628 14 79.45
T72 6 6.252 7.969 2.815 12 37.512
ZSU-23-4 4 7.447 7.906 7.193 5 29.788
10 20 7.969 2.815 31 7.338
BM-21 10 6.51 8.108 3.972 18 65.1
T72 7 6.352 7.605 4.356 22 44.464
ZSU-23-4 4 7.215 7.343 7.045 6 28.86
11 21 8.108 3.972 46 6.592
BM-21 8 6.216 7.997 3.575 15 49.728
T72 5 6.377 7.926 5.039 10 31.885
ZSU-23-4 4 7.433 7.993 7.455 9 29.732
12 17 7.997 3.575 34 6.550
BM-21 9 6.461 7.765 4.69 15 58.149
T72 7 6.597 7.982 4.854 11 46.179
ZSU-23-4 4 7.477 7.922 7.199 6 29.908
20 7.982 4.69 32 6.712
The fourth column under 
each run represents the 




BM-21 9 6.744 7.948 4.537 14 60.696
T72 8 6.492 7.883 3.471 13 51.936
ZSU-23-4 4 6.417 7.714 4.429 13 25.668
14 21 7.948 3.471 40 6.586
BM-21 10 6.313 7.997 3.785 16 63.13
T72 6 5.674 7.878 3.158 11 34.044
ZSU-23-4 4 7.413 7.951 6.438 6 29.652
15 20 7.997 3.158 33 6.341
BM-21 11 5.726 7.918 2.126 19 62.986
T72 6 6.151 7.55 4.633 13 36.906
ZSU-23-4 4 6.875 7.747 5.934 6 27.5
16 21 7.918 2.126 38 6.066
BM-21 8 6.79 7.995 4.393 14 54.32
T72 7 5.883 7.535 3.325 10 41.181
ZSU-23-4 4 6.377 7.364 4.474 13 25.508
17 19 7.995 3.325 37 6.369
BM-21 9 6.773 7.999 4.507 17 60.957
T72 8 6.156 7.919 3.064 19 49.248
ZSU-23-4 4 7.291 7.951 6.629 5 29.164
18 21 7.999 3.064 41 6.637
BM-21 10 6.464 7.936 4.363 13 64.64
T72 6 6.255 7.111 4.563 8 37.53
ZSU-23-4 4 7.408 7.951 7.095 9 29.632
19 20 7.951 4.363 30 6.590
BM-21 11 6.562 7.982 3.925 14 72.182
T72 4 5.898 7.674 4.953 8 23.592
ZSU-23-4 4 7.105 7.938 5.91 6 28.42
20 19 7.982 3.925 28 6.537
BM-21 9 5.638 7.718 2.028 19 50.742
T72 7 7.08 7.889 5.207 11 49.56
ZSU-23-4 4 7.384 7.951 6.583 6 29.536
21 20 7.951 2.028 36 6.492
BM-21 12 6.588 7.977 2.564 14 79.056
T72 6 5.259 7.408 1.747 10 31.554
ZSU-23-4 4 7.22 7.951 6.438 6 28.88
22 22 7.977 1.747 30 6.340
BM-21 10 6.239 7.997 2.52 15 62.39
T72 7 5.559 7.926 1.851 14 38.913
ZSU-23-4 4 7.265 7.993 6.453 5 29.06
23 21 7.997 1.851 34 6.208
BM-21 6 5.902 7.773 4.411 13 35.412
T72 6 5.532 7.714 3.1 10 33.192
ZSU-23-4 4 7.169 7.852 6.612 6 28.676
24 16 7.852 3.1 29 6.080
BM-21 11 6.124 7.745 3.356 18 67.364
T72 6 6.184 7.824 2.91 13 37.104
ZSU-23-4 4 7.259 7.906 6.433 5 29.036
25 21 7.906 2.91 36 6.357
BM-21 9 6.33 7.952 4.411 17 56.97
T72 5 6.286 7.97 4.519 6 31.43
ZSU-23-4 4 6.431 7.922 4.678 7 25.724
18 7.97 4.411 30 6.340  
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2. Scenario 255 (CM Direct Fire) 
Run Kills Avg KR Max KR Min KR Shots Wt. Avg KR AVG KR
1
BM-21 13 9.783 11.944 6.866 20 155.272
T72 6 8.251 9.427 7.033 6 56.562
ZSU-23-4 4 10.005 11.88 7.918 5 47.52
2 23 11.944 6.866 31 11.276
BM-21 14 9.129 11.933 7.232 21 127.806
T72 7 10.067 11.949 7.931 9 70.469
ZSU-23-4 4 9.781 10.96 8.338 4 39.124
3 25 11.949 7.232 34 9.496
BM-21 14 9.555 11.983 6.386 17 133.77
T72 8 8.633 11.98 6.84 9 69.064
ZSU-23-4 4 10.274 11.564 8.54 4 41.096
4 26 11.983 6.386 30 9.382
BM-21 13 9.418 11.983 6.909 18 122.434
T72 7 8.368 9.498 6.717 7 58.576
ZSU-23-4 4 9.878 11.789 7.804 4 39.512
5 24 11.983 6.717 29 9.188
BM-21 13 9.418 11.983 6.909 18 122.434
T72 7 8.368 9.085 6.717 7 58.576
ZSU-23-4 4 9.878 11.789 7.804 4 39.512
6 24 11.983 6.717 29 9.188
BM-21 14 9.239 11.128 6.436 18 129.346
T72 7 8.638 11.514 6.834 7 60.466
ZSU-23-4 4 10.125 11.564 8.606 4 40.5
7 25 11.564 6.436 29 9.212
BM-21 15 9.741 11.936 6.536 18 146.115
T72 6 8.623 11.83 5.679 8 51.738
ZSU-23-4 4 9.409 11.329 7.594 5 37.636
8 25 11.936 5.679 31 9.420
BM-21 13 9.364 11.956 6.272 17 121.732
T72 5 8.73 9.47 7.606 5 43.65
ZSU-23-4 4 8.384 10.789 6.921 5 33.536
9 22 11.956 6.272 27 9.042
BM-21 12 9.453 11.945 6.339 17 113.436
T72 8 8.927 11.752 6.943 9 71.416
ZSU-23-4 4 8.925 11.69 7.153 7 35.7
10 24 11.945 6.339 33 9.190
BM-21 14 9.205 11.983 4.7 17 128.87
T72 5 8.648 10.989 6.428 7 43.24
ZSU-23-4 4 10.247 11.88 8.606 4 40.988
11 23 11.983 4.7 28 9.265
BM-21 12 8.943 11.933 7.024 20 107.316
T72 8 8.721 11.203 7.034 12 69.768
ZSU-23-4 4 8.719 10.96 6.147 5 34.876
12 24 11.933 6.147 37 8.832
BM-21 14 9.764 11.949 6.286 18 136.696
T72 8 9.437 11.681 8.132 9 75.496
ZSU-23-4 4 8.521 11.88 6.055 4 34.084
26 11.949 6.055 31 9.472
The fourth column under 
each run represents the 





BM-21 13 9.597 11.911 7.203 19 124.761
T72 6 9.64 11.082 8.13 7 57.84
ZSU-23-4 4 7.204 8.313 5.947 8 28.816
14 23 11.911 5.947 34 9.192
BM-21 15 9.101 11.97 5.804 18 136.515
T72 7 8.598 11.924 3.709 8 60.186
ZSU-23-4 4 8.036 10.882 5.513 8 32.144
15 26 11.97 3.709 34 8.802
BM-21 14 9.397 11.944 4.506 19 131.558
T72 8 9.815 11.949 7.606 8 78.52
ZSU-23-4 4 10.295 11.255 9.331 5 41.18
16 26 11.949 4.506 32 9.664
BM-21 13 10.243 11.911 7.27 21 133.159
T72 5 7.743 9.169 6.946 9 38.715
ZSU-23-4 4 8.758 10.899 6.391 6 35.032
17 22 11.911 6.391 36 9.405
BM-21 14 9.544 11.983 5.565 20 133.616
T72 7 8.739 11.481 6.931 8 61.173
ZSU-23-4 4 9.582 11.247 7.906 6 38.328
18 25 11.983 5.565 34 9.325
BM-21 15 9.213 11.983 6.118 20 138.195
T72 8 8.931 11.481 6.911 11 71.448
ZSU-23-4 4 9.582 11.247 7.906 6 38.328
19 27 11.983 6.118 37 9.184
BM-21 14 9.392 11.949 7.307 16 131.488
T72 8 9.825 11.938 6.819 11 78.6
ZSU-23-4 4 10.085 11.614 7.906 4 40.34
20 26 11.949 6.819 31 9.632
BM-21 13 9.303 11.954 5.009 17 120.939
T72 8 8.559 9.886 4.915 10 68.472
ZSU-23-4 4 10.122 11.789 8.436 7 40.488
21 25 11.954 4.915 34 9.196
BM-21 14 9.384 11.949 6.336 19 131.376
T72 7 9.176 10.629 6.944 8 64.232
ZSU-23-4 4 7.849 10.504 5.376 6 31.396
22 25 11.949 5.376 33 9.080
BM-21 14 8.926 11.911 7.14 18 124.964
T72 8 8.332 11.488 4.3 12 66.656
ZSU-23-4 4 8.19 11.292 6.89 5 32.76
23 26 11.911 4.3 35 8.630
BM-21 14 9.429 11.787 6.436 19 132.006
T72 6 8.288 10.883 7.165 8 49.728
ZSU-23-4 4 9.996 10.966 9.43 4 39.984
24 24 11.787 6.436 31 9.238
BM-21 14 8.932 11.922 5.36 19 125.048
T72 7 8.922 10.03 7.807 8 62.454
ZSU-23-4 4 9.693 11.547 7.556 4 38.772
25 25 11.922 5.36 31 9.051
BM-21 15 9.503 11.899 6.436 23 142.545
T72 6 9.14 11.949 7.47 9 54.84
ZSU-23-4 4 9.769 11.88 7.523 6 39.076
25 11.949 6.436 38 9.458  
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3. Scenario 235 (CM Fire-and-Forget) 
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Run Kills Avg KR Max KR Min KR Shots Wt. Avg KR AVG KR
1
BM-21 9 10.092 11.945 7.038 15 90.828
T72 5 8.835 11.488 5.984 7 44.175
ZSU-23-4 4 10.047 11.352 8.606 4 40.188
ICM 10 7.66 11.95 3.81 25 76.6
2 28 11.95 3.81 51 8.993
BM-21 13 9.792 11.989 6.536 15 127.296
T72 5 8.835 11.488 5.984 7 44.175
ZSU-23-4 4 10.047 11.352 8.606 4 40.188
ICM 8 6.97 9.79 4.37 18 55.76
3 30 11.989 4.37 44 8.914
BM-21 10 9.812 11.97 7.731 12 98.12
T72 4 8.132 9.732 4.051 5 32.528
ZSU-23-4 3 9.407 10.921 8.313 6 28.221
ICM 11 6.48 12.4 4.05 25 71.28
4 28 12.4 4.05 48 8.220
BM-21 12 9.753 11.911 7.242 20 117.036
T72 3 9.876 11.949 8.08 4 29.628
ZSU-23-4 3 8.453 9.085 7.96 4 25.359
ICM 9 7.81 11.23 4.53 28 70.29
5 27 11.949 4.53 56 8.975
BM-21 10 9.615 11.944 5.247 15 96.15
T72 4 9.692 11.949 6.943 4 38.768
ZSU-23-4 4 9.819 11.69 8.183 4 39.276
ICM 11 6.36 10.97 4.77 25 120.67
6 29 11.949 4.77 48 10.168
BM-21 13 8.995 11.883 6.286 15 116.935
T72 5 9.022 11.488 7.322 7 45.11
ZSU-23-4 4 8.489 10.504 5.93 5 33.956
ICM 6 6.77 10.76 4.53 18 40.62
7 28 11.883 4.53 45 8.451
BM-21 12 9.226 11.966 6.486 18 110.712
T72 4 8.912 11.488 6.919 6 35.648
ZSU-23-4 4 8.48 11.44 5.762 5 33.92
ICM 8 6.21 10.97 4.81 24 49.68
8 28 11.966 4.81 53 8.213
BM-21 12 8.914 11.944 6.025 18 106.968
T72 6 8.181 11.432 5.67 6 49.086
ZSU-23-4 4 9.996 11.696 8.323 5 39.984
ICM 6 5.99 6.89 5.04 18 35.94
9 28 11.944 5.04 47 8.285
BM-21 7 9.175 11.289 7.513 14 64.225
T72 7 9.502 11.949 6.901 9 66.514
ZSU-23-4 7 9.681 11.515 8.442 5 67.767
ICM 7 6.84 11.59 5.04 14 47.88
10 28 11.949 5.04 42 8.800
BM-21 8 9.61 11.97 7.485 14 76.88
T72 8 7.877 11.083 6.335 7 63.016
ZSU-23-4 8 10.171 11.88 8.338 4 81.368
ICM 8 6.23 8.27 4.77 19 49.84
11 32 11.97 4.77 44 8.472
BM-21 13 9.72 11.933 6.486 15 126.36
T72 5 9.794 11.373 9.264 8 48.97
ZSU-23-4 3 8.968 10.96 7.508 4 26.904
ICM 6 7.81 9.54 5.04 13 46.86
12 27 11.933 5.04 40 9.226
BM-21 11 9.461 11.586 6.218 18 104.071
T72 3 8.104 9.482 7.225 7 24.312
ZSU-23-4 4 10.091 11.449 9.37 5 40.364
ICM 7 6.66 9.65 3.98 19 46.62
25 11.586 3.98 49 8.615
The fourth column under 
each run represents the 





BM-21 11 9.665 11.983 7.526 14 106.315
T72 5 9.384 11.914 6.927 6 46.92
ZSU-23-4 2 8.431 9.085 7.778 3 16.862
ICM 10 6.79 11.59 4.77 22 67.9
14 28 11.983 4.77 45 8.500
BM-21 11 9.383 11.933 7.188 13 103.213
T72 4 7.382 10.424 4.674 4 29.528
ZSU-23-4 3 10.338 11.789 7.749 5 31.014
ICM 9 6.74 11.59 5.04 21 60.66
15 27 11.933 4.674 43 8.312
BM-21 13 9.328 11.899 6.517 15 121.264
T72 4 9.403 11.938 7.98 4 37.612
ZSU-23-4 4 10.175 11.547 9.233 5 40.7
ICM 7 6.98 11.68 4.53 27 48.86
16 28 11.938 4.53 51 8.873
BM-21 10 9.752 11.945 6.882 16 97.52
T72 3 8.289 9.098 7.54 3 24.867
ZSU-23-4 4 9.779 11.696 8.323 5 39.116
ICM 9 6.92 11.32 4.8 23 62.28
17 26 11.945 4.8 47 8.607
BM-21 7 9.822 11.945 7.053 11 68.754
T72 6 10.717 11.914 6.985 6 64.302
ZSU-23-4 3 7.396 8.183 6.132 5 22.188
ICM 12 7.05 10.67 4.8 23 84.6
18 28 11.945 4.8 45 8.566
BM-21 11 10.149 11.911 7.189 16 111.639
T72 4 10.008 11.949 7.804 6 40.032
ZSU-23-4 4 9.682 11.137 8.183 4 38.728
ICM 7 7.06 9.54 4.77 22 49.42
19 26 11.949 4.77 48 9.224
BM-21 11 9.056 11.914 6.336 15 99.616
T72 7 9.049 11.88 6.87 8 63.343
ZSU-23-4 4 9.779 11.564 7.701 4 39.116
ICM 6 8.2 11.79 4.85 16 49.2
20 28 11.914 4.85 43 8.974
BM-21 11 8.921 11.922 5.988 13 98.131
T72 3 8.967 9.682 8.599 4 26.901
ZSU-23-4 4 10.122 11.789 8.436 7 40.488
ICM 7 7.48 11.79 4.53 11 52.36
21 25 11.922 4.53 35 8.715
BM-21 13 10.048 11.945 7.267 19 130.624
T72 4 9.976 11.98 7.712 4 39.904
ZSU-23-4 4 9.917 11.564 7.872 5 39.668
ICM 8 6.73 11.68 4.81 18 53.84
22 29 11.98 4.81 46 9.105
BM-21 13 9.693 11.909 7.369 16 126.009
T72 4 7.683 11.02 4.524 6 30.732
ZSU-23-4 3 8.851 11.789 6.58 3 26.553
ICM 7 5.77 9.1 4.8 11 40.39
23 27 11.909 4.524 36 8.285
BM-21 11 9.252 11.933 6.336 13 101.772
T72 6 9.747 11.488 7.221 8 58.482
ZSU-23-4 4 10.138 11.613 8.183 4 40.552
ICM 5 9.83 11.59 4.74 18 49.15
24 26 11.933 4.74 43 9.614
BM-21 14 10.011 11.949 7.261 17 140.154
T72 5 9.189 11.889 7.325 5 45.945
ZSU-23-4 4 9.8 11.674 8.034 4 39.2
ICM 6 7.32 11.39 4.8 17 43.92
25 29 11.949 4.8 43 9.283
BM-21 9 9.648 11.944 6.909 16 86.832
T72 4 8.166 11.481 4.655 6 32.664
ZSU-23-4 3 9.629 11.247 8.308 4 28.887
ICM 10 5.54 6.89 4.77 22 55.4
26 11.944 4.655 48 7.838  
APPENDIX C.  MOE STATISTICAL SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVES 
This appendix provides the summary descriptives of the 
statistics for each MOE independently.  The data was 
analyzed and these reports produced by the Excel Analyze-it 
statistical add-in.  A statistical summary descriptive is 
provided for each MOE by scenario.  The scenarios are 
Hellfire Baseline (245), CM Direct Fire (255), and CM Fire-
and-Forget (235). 
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A. SUMMARY STATISTICS MOE 1 – LETHALITY 
analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 1 - Lethality -  HF Baseline - Kills
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 19.520
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analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 1 - Lethality - CM Direct Fire - Kills
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 24.6
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analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 1 - Lethality - CM Fire and Forget - Kills
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 27.640
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B. SUMMARY STATISTICS MOE 2 – SURVIVABILITY 
analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 2 - Survivability - HF Baseline
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 1.920
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 analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 2 - Survivability - CM Direct Fire
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 1.040
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analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 2 - Survivability - CM Fire and Forget
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 0.720
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C. SUMMARY STATISTICS MOE 3 – ENGAGEMENT 
analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 3 -  Engagement - Hellfire Baseline
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 6.442
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analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 3 -  Engagement - CM Direct Fire
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 9.313
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 analysed with: Analyse-it + General 1.62 
Test  Continuous summary descriptives
 
 MOE 3 -  Engagement - CM Fire and Forget 
Performed by  Major John M. Vannoy Date 27 March 2002
n 25  (cases excluded: 1 due to missing values)
Mean 8.769
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APPENDIX D.  BATTLEFIELD GRAPHIC 
This appendix provides a screen shot of the Janus 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  104
LIST OF REFERENCES 
1. Department of Defense. Interim Regulation, DoD 5000.2-
R. 4 January 2001. 
 
2. PEO Tactical Missiles. “Common Missile (CM) – 
Analytical Support to Analysis of Alternatives.” 3 
August 2001. 
 
3. PEO Tactical Missiles. “Missile Modernization Campaign 
Plan, General Officer Steering Committee #6.” 3 May 
2001. 
 
4. PEO Tactical Missiles. “Common Missile Background and 
Description.” https://peotm.redstone.army.mil/. 5 
March 2001. 
 
5. Common Missile Project Office. “Program Overview.” 1 
November 2001. 
 
6. Keller, Sean P. “Simulation-Based Acquisition: Real-
World Examples.” RD&A Magazine. September-October 
1998: 25-26. 
 
7. Headquarters TRADOC. “Operational Requirements 
Document for the Joint Common Missile. Unclassified 
Version – Post Staffing.” 12 March 2001. 
 
8. Common Missile Project Office. “Information Paper on 
the Common Missile Program.” 13 July 2001. 
 
9. Pike, John. Military Analyst Network: AGM-114 
Hellfire. April 2000. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/missile/agm-114.htm. 
 
10. Department of the Army. Janus Version 7.06D 
Documentation: Volume 1, TRADOC Analysis Center – 
White Sands Missile Range. July 2000. New Mexico. 
 
11. Vannoy, John M. “AH-64D Longbow Apache Employment 
Information Paper.” 10 March 2000. 
 
12. Department of the Army. Field Manual 1-111 Aviation 
Brigades. 27 October 1997. 
  105
 
13. 21st Cavalry. “AH-64D Techniques, Tactics, and 
Procedures.” 6 April 2000. 
 
14. Vannoy, John M. “Instructional Briefing: Deep Attack.” 
2 August 1999. 
 
15. Headquarters Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-
61: Armor and Mechanized Based Opposing Force 
Operational Art. 26 January 1998. 
 
16. Headquarters Department of the Army. Field Manual 100-
60: Armor and Mechanized Based Opposing Force 
Organization Guide. 16 July 1997. 
 
17. Eisenhard, Scot. Common Missile Program Office 
Contractor Analyst. Quality Research. Personal 
Meeting. 7 Dec 2001. 
 
18. Perry, Robert. Common Missile Simulations Lead 
Engineer. Personal Meeting. 9 November 2001. 
 
19. Smith, Marvin.  Common Missile Contractor Analyst. 
Quality Research. 9 November 2001. 
 
20. Hollis, Walter W., and Patenaude, Anne. “Simulation 
Based Acquisition: Can We Stay the Course?” Army RD&A, 
May-June 1999: 11-14. 
 
21. Department of the Army, Army Model and Simulation 
Executive Council (AMSEC). “Planning Guidelines for 
Simulation and Modeling for Acquisition, Requirements, 
and Training (SMART).” September 15, 2000. 
 
22. Pike, John. Military Analyst Network: AH-64 Apache. 
May 29, 2000. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ac/ah64.htm. 
 









25. Pike, John. Military Analyst Network: ZSU-23-4. 
January 22, 1999. http://www.fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/land/row/zsu-23-4.htm. 
 
26.  Analyze-it for Microsoft Excel Statistical Add-in 
Software Version 1.62.  January 1, 2002. 
 
27. Brusaw, Charles T., Alred, Gerald J., and Oliu, Walter 
E. Handbook of Technical Writing – Fifth Edition. New 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  108
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3. Department of the Army  
Program Executive Office Aviation 
Redstone Arsenal, AL 
 
4. Department of the Army   
Common Missile Program Office 
ATTN: Robert Perry 
Redstone Arsenal, AL 
 
5. Department of the Army 
TRADOC System Manager Comanche 
Fort Rucker, AL 
 
6. Department of the Army  
Comanche Program Office 
Redstone Arsenal, AL 
 
7. Department of the Army 
Apache Program Office 
Redstone Arsenal, AL 
 
8. Dr. Keith Snider 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
9. Professor Bard Mansager 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
10. CPT(P) Scott Crino 
TRAC – Monterey 
Monterey, CA 
 
11. Dr. David Lamm 
Naval Postgraduate School 
  109
Monterey, CA 
